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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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ERRATUM: In JPRS 76412, 11 September 1980, No 1621 of this series in the article entitled, "Portrait of Otto Steenholdt, Greenland Pro-Danish Party Chairman," on page 28, please change EF to read EC: Paragraph 2, lines 2, 3, 5, 9, and 11.

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DAVIGNON EXPLAINS PLAN TO SAVE EUROPEAN STEEL INDUSTRY

Brussels LE SOIR in French 11 Oct 80 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Etienne Davignon, European commissioner for industrial policy by Benedicte Vaes, Guy Depas; date and place not given]

[Text] According to Etienne Davignon, European commissioner for industrial policy, the objectives of the recovery plan recently endorsed, with some reservations, by the Council of Ministers of the Nine in Luxembourg are: to fight for jobs, to fight to save the European steel industry, and to avoid throwing away 18 billion francs worth of lost funds in the steelworks of the EEC. The European Commission does not want to adopt control measures, Etienne Davignon explained in answer to the reservations of the Federal Republic of Germany, a country which considers itself as the advocate of economic liberalism. But nor does it want to be the official receiver of a bankruptcy. What it hopes to do is to become the instrument of recovery.

Given this situation, the absolutely necessary cutback in steel production, scheduled to be ordered throughout the Community within the next few days, will create great changes. There is no doubt that prices will recover as a result of a more balanced supply and demand but there is also a risk of social difficulties on the short term and, perhaps, the danger of distortion due to competition for the more vulnerable companies.

What measures does the EEC Commission intend to adopt, particularly in the social sphere, to avoid those hazards? This was the first thing we asked Mr Davignon.

[Answer] Let me put it quite plainly: the cutback in production has already taken place. It is the result of a drop in the demand for steel due to the recession, to the crisis in the current economic situation which is hitting hard those sectors which are traditionally the big clients of the steel industry such as the car industry, construction and so on.

The purpose of our action is to fight for jobs. The Belgian labor unions understood this when they asked, about a month ago, that Article 58 be enforced.

Unless we put a quick stop to the collapse of the prices, producers will not only be unable to secure the funds to finance the investments required by the re-organization but they will also be unable to maintain the equipment in its present condition. The net result of these developments will be to lose the ability to produce under conditions of sufficient efficiency.

If we do not have the most basic solidarity, jobs will be threatened even in the plants with the highest rate of performance. The price war has reached such proportions that even those firms can no longer cover their production costs.

Based on the powers granted to it by that Treaty, the European Commission cannot sit back and watch a key industrial sector as the steel industry just disappear.

The commission's initiative consists in carrying out a fair distribution of the total steel production, undoubtedly declining --this cannot be avoided--but the only way to stop the suicidal nose dive where a fatalist attitude is leading us is to reestablish a balance between the supply and the demand.

But Europe's policy must also consider the human aspect and this is why the ECSC [European Coal and Steel Community] intervenes financially both to compensate in part (the states will contribute the rest) coal and steel workers who have lost their jobs and to guarantee that they are trained in new skills.

What we really want is to create the conditions under which the European action will protect the purchasing power of workers who are affected by the reorganization and of workers who are temporarily affected by the current economic crisis.

Since 1977, the commission has been saying that without additional funds for the social sector and to encourage the creation of jobs, fairness would not be maintained.

Urged by the commission, fully backed by the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers has been slow to acknowledge the need for social action on a European level in favor of the workers from the steel industry in crisis.

On Tuesday, the governments of the nine admitted that the European Commission must have the funds it has requested. An official and budgetary decision has been promised for November.

The commission is not a bankruptcy receiver, it must be an instrument of recovery. It can only play that role if the companies understand where their true interest lies and if the workers realize that we want to remove the constant threat hanging over their jobs.

No Bad Marks: Let Us Be Pragmatic

[Question] Statistic figures worked out by the European Commission have given the Benelux countries record bad marks in all categories for overstepping their production quotas between July 1979 and June 1980.

These statistics are challenged in our country. What are the facts? It is also reported that in Belgium it was mainly the Ghent subsidiary of Arbed-Sidmar which showed lack of discipline.

[Answer] The current crisis is made more acute by the fact that all the steel producers have been increasingly bold in disregarding all discipline. It is not a question of giving bad marks to some rather than others. Belgian steel firms, for instance, may have tried lately to compensate the distortions which they feel have affected them while they adhered to the community's discipline longer than others.

This example adequately illustrates the failure of confidence among producers. And it is a fact that confidence is essential for a system of voluntary limitations to operate successfully.

[Question] The usual 12-month period seems to be the point of reference used to determine the 1981 production quota which you intend to impose on each enterprise. Are you not afraid that there will be a distortion due to the competition in favor of those who are really responsible for the market upheaval?

[Answer] On the subject of the period used as a point of reference, first let me remind you that the period used by the commission as a basis for its recovery measures is longer than what you mentioned. In the system which are preparing, we shall use as point of reference the 12 best months of a period going from July 1977 to June 1980.

Naturally, the European Commission is aware of the distortion which could arise from a system applied, let us say, on a purely mathematical basis.

The additional studies being conducted by the commission together with all the producers are specifically intended to ensure that the companies are treated with fairness.

In other words, if it is found that a company has suffered as a result of a lack of solidarity and loyalty in the behavior of its competitors during the period used as a point of reference, this will be taken into consideration when its "reference" tonnage is established.

To Stop the Hemorrhage

[Question] The cutback in production will also have a positive effect on the level of prices. But is it obvious that this effect will not take place immediately and in the meantime companies will lose more money and in the case of the Walloon enterprises, they will go deeper into the red.

If the action being contemplated by the state does not solve the problem, and if private shareholders refuse to inject new funds, will the EEC come up with financial assistance to bridge the gap from the time when they have liquidity problems until such a time when the country's expected recovery is felt?

[Answer] As regards the first part of your question, I will only say that it is precisely to reverse the trend and put a stop to the drain of funds in steel enterprises throughout the European Community that the commission insists in rapidly implementing the proposed plan.

Under the present market conditions, marked by an average loss of around 1,800 Belgian francs per ton of steel produced, some 18 billion Belgian francs per month would be required to compensate for this loss throughout the community.

This theoretical figure is a haunting illustration of the magnitude of the crisis. It is to avoid throwing money into "lost funds" that the European Community has put forward its recovery strategy.

Also, according to the Treaty of Paris, the ECSC financial means of intervention are intended to carry out creative programs: investments, research.

Concerted Action

[Question] You have decided against setting up production quotas for the last quarter of 1980 before consulting with the enterprises. Does that mean that the commission agrees with the Belgian producers who have said that they want a ceiling of up to 20 percent in relation with the same quarter of 1979 or, on the contrary, does it mean that the commission intends to use this expedient to satisfy the German side, for instance, who seems to want relatively higher quotas.

[Answer] We are not going to engage in a big haggle over production quotas.

The reality is quite different: since the producers cannot adjust their own system and cannot show solidarity when they face a big drop in the demand of steel, the European Commission has been forced to turn to the most extreme and most restricting measures provided for in the Treaty of Paris.

The purpose of the European Commission is neither to reduce production nor to create an artificial shortage in the European steel market. This would be absurd. But the situation cannot be corrected as long as the gap between the supply and the demand remains so wide. Therefore, one must avoid anarchic cuts in production which have no effect. The only consequence of the current drop in production has been a collapse of the prices and an increase of the number of workers laid off for technical reasons....

To achieve successful results, the commission must know what the steel users intend to do. When it turns to their expert evaluation, the commission shows that it intends to "stick to the reality": the recommendations of the steel users will be taken into consideration in the preparation of the expected reduction quotas.

8796

CSO: 3100

NEW BOOKS DISCUSS COMMUNIST PARTIES' ORIGINS, FUTURE

Origins of PCF

Paris LE MATIN in French 10 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] Les Editions sociales have just published two works illustrating how the Congress of Tours unfolded and what the stakes were. The merit of these books is that they bring together scattered documents and totally unpublished reports that were found in personal archives. The book entitled "The Congress of Tours" includes for the first time all of the available documents, including three reports from L'HUMANITE hitherto unknown to the public. This 900-page work opens with an introduction describing the national and international environment, and presents the preparatory documents published in the press of the period, the motions and the resolutions. In it are also found the details of the six days of the Congress of Tours and "minority" reports. In all, 500 notes, 400 biographies of all known participants in the congress, 96 departmental records of the electoral results, the names of the elected representatives and the rank and file, as well as an exhaustive bibliography. The work has the virtue of rendering accessible to everyone the debates of the congress, which, without the critical apparatus that makes up half of the book, are often difficult to understand.

The second book is the biography of Marcel Cachin, written by his daughter, Marcelle Hertzog-Cachin, who based her work on the discovery of her father's notebooks, in which every evening he scrupulously entered a summary of his activity, his thoughts and his judgments on events.

Future Worldwide Trends

Paris LE MATIN in French 12 Oct 80 pp 2, 3

Article by Christine Buci-Glucksmann; title omitted]

[Text] Alexandre Adler and Jean Rony have just published "The Internationale and the Human Race." Two authors who put their analyses together, but who also ended up with different conclusions, if one judges by the postscript by Alexandre Adler, who clearly puts distance between himself and the rest of the book. Christine Buci-Glucksmann, who in November is going

to publish in Editions Maspéro "The Social-Democratic Challenge," in collaboration with Gorn Therborn, analyzes the PCF's current strategy, from Adler and Rony's book.

In this period of division on the left, the appearance of Adler and Rony's book, "The Internationale and the Human Race,"* will surely provide a breath of fresh air. At last, an historical and political reflection that aims, with a certain impertinence of tone and words, at "unitary recomposition" of a divided European left and a workers' movement in crisis. Counter to all present sectarianisms, all of their words work toward shedding light on one thesis: strengthening of the detente, the political unblocking in the East; coming through a "leftist Europe" and the revival of an open Eurocommunism.

An identity of positions that for all that does not rule out visible differences in appraisals between the first part and Adler's postscript: "Kabul and the Communist Movement at the Crossroads" and the second part by Rony: "Europe and the Proletarian."* There remains the decisive stakes: what is the future for the Western Communist Parties?

The first diagnosis: the crisis in the European left, its decline, primarily have to do with their relations with the working class and society. A youth increasingly indifferent to the large political organizations, a segmented working class grappling with that "non-class" of holders of precarious jobs and unemployed, the explosion of all the autonomies and all the terrorism--so many symptoms of the gravity of the diagnosis.

Not to mention the gap existing between the new political aspirations and practices born outside the factory and those of a workers' movement mainly centered on a Keynesian model, more or less leftist (production, government, growth).

For lack of changing their relations with the working class, the European workers' parties--all components together--are in great danger of experiencing long-lasting strategic impasses.

In which case the bourgeoisie will continue to score points. So one is very far from party high marks. That of a "bourgeoisie in failure" (G. Marchais), that of an "epoch of revolutions" like the singing future. That of an internationalism assassinated in the Indochinese tragedy and "the irremediable effacement of the image of the socialist countries in the West." All of this is said, and said well.

Also, the future of the Western Communist Parties clings to this fragile thread: not to confuse the emancipation of the working class with the single cause of the "real socialism" states. To accentuate their own independence and develop that new non-aligned internationalism preached by the PCI and abandoned by the PCF. From that point of view Kabul is certainly the test of Eurocommunism. There the analyses by Adler and Rony converge. Adler's, which shows how the withdrawal of the USSR in Islam after the crisis of Nasserian panarabism and the forming of a homogeneous pro-Soviet bloc in the Horn of Africa, led the USSR to increasingly favor its big-power geo-political interests to the detriment of the revolution. The intervention in Afghanistan stands out on the horizon. Rony's analysis, which is in the area of the

*Essai Mazarine.

*Through a regrettable technical error, the two parts of the book are not signed. What is more, the postscript by Adler--which obviously involves him alone--is placed after Rony's text, at the end. Each author should be given the responsibility for his own text.

Eurocommunism of the PCI and the PCE, whose latest developments, difficulties and profound logic he outlines. For the Italo-Spanish condemnation of the Soviet intervention is really "a question of principle" for the communists. Contrary to the rights of a people to self-determination, it is aggravating the danger of war and marks a true military turn in the USSR's policy. It is opposed to that polycentric expansion of the "revolutionary forces" of which Ingrao speaks (in the book's appendix).

There is better measurement, with supporting documents, of what separates this Eurocommunism from "the muscled Eurocommunism" of the PCF. Its chances are still to be evaluated. One certainly cannot share Adler's too-optimistic diagnosis: potential changes in the USSR depend on its Europeanization (integration into the world market, respect for the political growth of the countries of the East). The threats hanging over the Polish workers' democratic victory speak volumes. But, to follow his words and the ardent rebuilding of the broad lines of political evolution in Europe proposed by Rony, it is easier to measure the scope of the alternative. Either a strategy of democratically increasing the communist parties overall, or else that "strategy of declining influence" described by Rony in connection with the PCF. It is also easier to measure the difficult imperatives of the hour:

Political openness to social-democratic forces, irreducible to a simple "instrument of imperialism," on precise points (detente, for example).

Resumption, far from the fundamentalism on every side, of a constructive relation between socialists and communists, even against the Giscard government and the fascist-racist revivals.

One simple question: is it possible to reconcile these "slow evolutions" to a leftist Europe with the point of departure the crisis in the workers' movement in its relations to policy? Doesn't Eurocommunism need something more? A plan for an emancipated society, a post-Keynesian socialism, the true alternative to the crisis of the two state-control "models:" the Soviet and the neo-Keynesian.

8946

CSO: 3100

BENELUX UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES REACH ALARMING PROPORTIONS

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 9 Oct 80 p 13

[Article by pmr: "Alarming Unemployment Figures in Benelux: Clear Indications of Recession"]

[Text] Brussels, 7 Oct--Accurately reflecting international developments, the economy of the Benelux countries, which is dependent up to 50 percent on exports, has been characterized since spring by a marked moderation in employment and rapidly rising unemployment figures. In Belgium and Luxemburg the weakening of the economy is made even more severe by the importance of the especially hard-hit steel industry, while in the Netherlands the collapse of the construction industry is becoming increasingly worrisome.

Concerted Action Failed in Holland

In the Netherlands the considerable economic growth, primarily due to a marked increase in exports, that had been registered in the beginning of the year, had stagnated by early summer. In the first quarter the export volume increased by 8 percent, even a little more rapidly than import increases of 7 percent. In the second quarter, however, imports stagnated while exports fell by 1 percent, so that exports and imports both rose by 3 percent in the first half of the year. Due to price increases for natural gas exports the balance of trade deteriorated only marginally. In July, however, the imports expanded markedly, especially due to increased petroleum imports, so that the balance of trade for the first 7 months of the year indicates an increase in the deficit from 2.3 billion guilders to 4.1 billion guilders, with imports increasing by 22 percent, exports by 20 percent.

The domestic market was characterized by a strong increase of investments in the first months. In the first quarter investment in durable goods rose by 15.5 percent as compared to the same period last year. Total investment volume even rose by 35 percent, due primarily to the depressed level caused by the harsh winter last year. Private consumption slowed considerably during the first half of the year because of government-decreed salary slowdowns and a limitation of consumer credit; the increase in retail sales by 6 percent in the first half of the year barely matched the inflation rate, that accelerated steadily throughout the year and reached 7 percent in August. Industrial growth was halved, decreasing from 4 percent the first quarter to 2 percent for the first half of the year. The clothing, petroleum and chemical industries were hit the hardest in the second quarter.

The truly alarming branch of the economy, however, is the construction industry, which is suffering from the high interest level and the unclear wage developments. During the year the number of unemployed construction workers increased from about 10,000 to almost 30,000. The total number of unemployed has also been exceeding the postwar record since July. From March to September the unemployment rate increased from 5 percent to 6.1 percent of the working population.

The government hopes to revive the economy by cutting the budget deficit and by achieving a real decrease in wages. The proposal to limit salary demands voluntarily by 2 percent was, however, not well received by management or unions, and just recently the first round of negotiations for a "concerted action" failed. The management demands greater savings in the state budget and the social services. The unions do not want to touch the social security system, and only want the higher income brackets to cough up additional taxes. The cabinet ventured a first step in that direction on 1 October, ordering an average decrease of physicians' fees by 5 percent, and was promptly hit by a legal suit from those affected. Minister of Social Affairs Albeda is considering reductions in vacation pay and in the automatic inflation adjustments in view of the failure of voluntary salary limitation. A government wage freeze along the lines of the current year does not seem to be under cabinet discussion for the 1981 election year.

Unbridled Growth of the Belgium State Debt

The business curve of the Belgian national bank, compiled each month on the basis of a poll regarding the expectations of businessmen, had climbed to 100 points in October 1979, its highest point since 1976. Since that time the barometer has steadily fallen, with a small interruption at the beginning of the year. In August it stood at only 81.3 points. Industrial production, private consumption and investments showed considerable increases in the first half of the year, compared to the previous year. The upward movement slowed markedly in the second quarter, however. A considerable decline in employment is expected for the last months of the year. The Ministry of Economics, however, does not yet consider a serious recession to be in the offing.

Industrial production, including construction, rose in the first half of the year by 6 percent, but only by 0.1 percent from April to June. The chemical industry reported working at 77.8 percent of capacity during the second quarter, compared to 81.9 percent during the same period of the previous year. Steel production declined by 14 percent during July and August from its level the previous year. Investments increased by 19.1 percent during the first half of the year and according to sales tax statistics, retail trade increased by 11.2 percent. The inflation rate hovered around 6.5 percent from the beginning of the year, but accelerated to 6.7 percent in September.

The number of unemployed has increased alarmingly since July. Reaching 326,650 persons in September, it exceeded the level of the previous year by 13.7 percent. According to EEC statistics Belgium has in the meantime even surpassed Ireland, establishing a sad European record with an unemployment rate of 9.4 percent of the civilian labor force. According to Belgian statistics, "only" 7.9 percent of the labor force was unemployed at the end of September. This, however, does not include the almost 140,000 unemployed holding temporary jobs or forced into premature retirement.

The trade balance of the Belgian-Luxembourg economic union developed along similarly unfavorable lines. For the first 5 months it showed the value of imports increasing by 27.6 percent, that of exports increase by 24.9 percent, resulting in the increase of the trade deficit from 49 billion Belgian francs to 80 billion. The reduced business activity has, however, also influenced imports since April, with the result that during recent months the trade deficit has been smaller than in the previous year.

The Belgians are most worried by the rapidly increasing public debt, something that has been going on for some time. Within the first 6 months the finance minister has assumed credits in a measure originally contemplated for the entire year, namely 239 billion Belgian francs. The austerity budget for the next year was dismissed a few weeks after it was announced by government politicians as a mathematical sleight of hand. That the Belgian state economy has been on the brink of disaster has been considered an unquestioned fact for years. Lately, this has in any case been the cause of a government crisis.

Luxembourg Under the Sign of the Steel Crisis

The international business slowdown was hardly noticeable in Luxembourg in the first half of the year; the collapse of the steel industry, however, has made the perspectives for the second half-year much more ominous. In the first 6 months steel production increased by 5.4 percent, with the other branches of industry stagnating, but in the second quarter the new orders were already one-quarter under the level for the first quarter. The latest business report of the statistical office (Statoc) notes a weakening of private consumption and of investments. Since June the inflation rate has been at an annual rate of 6.4 percent. The number of unemployed jumped in September to 1,160. In relation to the labor force it is still under 1 percent. This statistic, however, does not include the more than 1,000 steel workers who have been employed at government expense in the "anticrisis department."

The government budget does not yet contain the financial assistance provisions demanded by the Arped concern. Even so, the 1981 proposed budget envisions a deficit of 3.15 billion Luxembourg francs (0.6 billion in 1980), an unusually high figure for Luxembourg. The budget provides for expenditures of 51.2 billion (45.8 billion in 1980) and for revenues of 48.1 billion (45.2 billion in 1980.) The deficit is to be covered by credits of 1.75 billion Luxembourg francs; the remainder is to be drawn from the budget reserves accumulated in previous years; at the beginning of the year the surplus stood at 6.25 billion Luxembourg francs.

9240
CSO: 3103

JØRGENSEN TO POSTPONE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS UNTIL SPRING

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Oct 80 p 10

[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen]

[Text] The spring compromise gives a breathing space from the opening of the Folketing on Tuesday [7 October]. On the other hand, a busy spring is in store, with wage agreement renewals, clarification of defense and housing policy, and new agreements with DUC [Danish Underground Consortium] on energy resources.

Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen is collecting spring problems. At the opening of the Folketing the day after tomorrow we can expect a quiet opening speech by the prime minister and a quite uncontroversial opening debate for the government. In the course of a few months, however, problems will begin to emerge one after another, culminating in the spring.

The spring compromise between the government and R [Radical Liberal Party], CD [Center-Democrats], and KRF [Christian People's Party] will give the prime minister a political truce in the fall. The negotiations on political subjects, which might disturb the peace, will not yet have arrived at the critical point. The trade union movement, which might disturb the peace, will be busily engaged next fall in getting ready for the wage agreement settlement in the spring. The internal problems in the Social Democratic Party surrounding the collaboration with the compromise parties and compromise policy can be kept quiet in the spring and probably will not burst into flame until the fall.

If the prime minister took stock of the coming problems now, there would be a good deal lined up for the spring. There will be no further interference with economic developments until spring. The wage agreement negotiations will be allowed to go on without interference as long as possible. The long-term housing policy will be taken care of by spring. The defense debates will be finished by 1 April. The energy problems will still be unsolved in a number of fields until spring.

Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen has urged the Social Democratic Folketing delegation to have a quiet, stable political autumn. For that reason his opening speech will be a conventional run-through of legislation with very few digressions into special Social Democratic desiderata beyond the compromise agreement of the fall of 1979. He has also emphasized that the coming months will show whether the compromise party collaboration with R, CD, and KRF is lasting and what alternatives can be

found, if any, for the period after 1981. The prime minister himself has stated that by spring he wishes to broaden the cooperation with V [the Liberal Party] or K [the Conservative Party] if that can be done. By degrees, however, a very large group within the Social Democratic Party is becoming critical of a long-term co-operation with the bourgeois parties, which under the compromise are having great influence in spite of their size as a brake on the Social Democratic Party's reform moves. Large parts of the trade union movement belong to this group.

The first and most acute political problem for the prime minister is the oil concession agreements with DUC. The social Democratic Party wants clear and increased control over that part of the energy supply, just as it has in other fields. DC and KRF are strongly opposed to this increased control, and if the government tries to put through a form of expropriation of the North Sea Oil on the ground of breakdown in negotiations with DUC, it can expect a clash with the compromise parties.

Another acute problem in the energy field is legislation concerning state oil dealers, but the planning for the natural gas net can also give rise to difficulties between the compromise parties.

The defense compromise negotiations have just ended for this year, but the government must, with its compromise partners, find a solution to the problem of the defense appropriations in the 1981 budget bill. Otherwise it will try to push the bill through the Folketing by itself.

The government wants to have a debate in the fall concerning distribution of surplus profits, and the debate will constitute the foundation for a possible government initiative. The trade union movement has already linked such an initiative up with a possible government intervention into the spring wage agreement negotiations. The compromise parties cannot accept such an intervention.

In the housing field the government must live up to the commitment in the spring compromise that housing expenditures must not increase in 1981, but the government at the same time wants to get a longer-range housing compromise completely negotiated by the spring or at least by the fall of next year. It can be expected to be very difficult for the compromise parties to come to an agreement.

In the tax field the Social Democratic Party still wants to make an attempt to get a tax reform through. The compromise parties cannot prevent such a proposal effective after the expiration of the compromise agreement, but it will not promote good feeling among them. The same applies to the proposal for the second stage of social income, which the government has decided to present.

About February or March the big political fights will come to pass on the economy, the wage agreements, the housing policy, and the tax policy. Not until that time will we find out how far the solidarity of the compromise parties is and how much cooperation can be expected concerning the future political line.

PAPER ACCUSES JØRGENSEN OF LACKING LEADERSHIP

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Oct 80 p 10

[Editorial: "Driving Into the Ditch"]

[Text] It is a disheveled prime minister that will meet the Folketing on Tuesday. Anker Jørgensen has behind him a party congress that passed resolutions he cannot be in agreement with. And today the Gallup political index reports that the congress did not strengthen the party's standing with the population. The Social Democratic Party is substantially weaker than at the time of the election a year ago.

Very recently the government has tried to stir up its own enthusiasm by some campaigns, which are marked by bombastic utterances. One of them is based on the prime minister's proclamation that the Social Democrats will not spend more on defense. It ignores Denmark's NATO obligations, and it expresses the prime minister's desire to run out on the promise he himself has given. The other is inspired by Poul Nielson's attempt to be the strong and goal-conscious energy minister that will go the way of socialism. He is not worried about favoring a policy that breaks agreements and promises that earlier Social Democratic ministers have made.

In both campaigns Anker Jørgensen's disheveled state is apparent. He knows quite well, of course, that the defense arrangement will be realistic, and that it will be harmful to the country if it is not. But he gives in, because he wants to comply with the voices that are being raised in his party. He wants to be everybody's man, and does not dare have a showdown with the left wing, which trusts him. Anker Jørgensen is hardly in doubt, either, about the obligations that the state has to A.P. Møller as licensee in the North Sea. He well knows that the state will not be capable of solving that enormous problem. But he gives in, because he wants to live up to the energy minister's and the left wing's demands to increase the state's influence and control.

A party leader and prime minister should lead his party and his government on an honest basis. If he does not, he will sooner or later be doomed to fall, both as party leader and as head of the government. It is not honest of a prime minister if he fails to live up to the obligations that rest upon him personally or upon his government. What Anker Jørgensen is failing to do in these weeks is no less than that.

In the coming weeks, when the Folketing has begun the new parliamentary year, the task must be to try to get the prime minister on the right track. If he continues on the course he has set for himself, he will wind up in the ditch.

8815

CSO: 3106

COMMENTATOR LOOKS AT SOCIALIST PACT WITH SMALL PARTIES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 10 Oct 80 pp 1, 11

[Article by Hans J. Poulsen]

[Text] Negotiators from the three small compromise parties have been regular visitors in the government offices in recent weeks. With their 21 seats the government's slender parliamentary safety net becomes an alliance that--with the crisis as a landmark--can extend to 1982 and even 1983. But how many party fruits have the Radical Liberals, Center Democrats, and Christian People's Party been able to harvest this fall? Are they--out of election fright--working gratis or for a minimum pay? BERLINGSKE AFTEN, against the background of the political situation during the week when the Folketing meets again, tries to investigate the influence they have exerted in the unequal game.

Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen did not have his pencil handy Wednesday 1 October when he initiated the three small compromise parties into the content of his opening speech to the Folketing. The catalog of laws was not up for discussion at that meeting. The oral part of the report on "the general state of the nation and the measures the measures contemplated by the government" was read out, but gave rise to no comments that made it necessary to make corrections, except for a single technical correction concerning the social income.

Both before and after that meeting in the Prime Minister's Department it was emphasized on both sides that the opening speech was and is the government's. An attitude that was also confirmed Tuesday when the 179 members of the Folketing heard the speech at the opening of parliament and were presented with the catalog of laws and the desiderata of the individual cabinet ministers. There are hot potatoes in the government's bag of laws, things on which the solid cooperation of all the compromise parties cannot be counted on in advance: the energy policy, the defense arrangement with unchanged budget limits, compulsory distribution of surplus profits, and parts of the social income are some of the hottest.

The presentation of the speech *before* its public delivery cost the government nothing in relation to the compromise parties. It was merely a gesture with a built-in psychological effect; it was obviously intended to produce a "sufficiently good internal climate for further dealings," as one of the participants expressed it to BERLINGSKE AFTEN.

The May 1980 Ax

The opening speech Tuesday was quite lacking in optimism with regard to the outside climate. Drop in real wages, reduced balance of payments, great increase in unemployment are the political barometer readings.

This year's May compromise with the three small parties runs until the end of 1981 and is the ax that Anker Jørgensen's minority government has chosen for its economic policy. The compromise, which involves an industry support in the billion-kroner class that has been very difficult to shape in practice, is remembered by the voters chiefly for a MOMS [value added tax] increase to 22 percent and for new energy taxes.

Otherwise it was mostly an overall agreement with a number of headlines that were put out as opportunity offered. A part of the agreement will be embodied in legal form during this fall. The rate of advance will pick up.

Throughout the summer, negotiations were conducted at Marienborg, in which the three small compromise parties introduced their desiderata, backed by few seats. On no occasion did the government--as BERLINGSKE AFTEN is informed by participants in the negotiations--try to "majoritize" them. But it was in the air that the three parties had only 10, 6, and 5 seats respectively, and that neither the Gallup poll nor any other opinion samplings showed any tendencies that would clearly prompt them to jump off the back of the compromise wagon.

When the round of negotiations with an eye to the opening of the Folketing and the fall political work started, 912 million kroner was a key figure. On 15 September the Government presented a detailed plan for the remaining economies. From the spring there had been no labels on the 912 million kroner, but now there was such an economy mood that the amount was raised to 1 billion kroner. Later, however, the figure came back down, for, as one of the participants says, "To tell the truth, we did not have enough imagination to find the last 88 million kroner."

The negotiating phase from 15 September up to and including Monday [6 October] involved a long series of discussions, sometimes between the prime minister and the leaders of the small compromise parties (who liked to have an expert with them), sometimes between the various ministers and the parties' experts on the specific fields. But more than once the small parties felt that they were drawing the shortest straw when the government's ministers presented their calculations.

"Out Shopping for Expertise"

With regard to expertise, the government has many instruments to play upon by virtue of its access to the all the officials of the central administration; the small parties, like the rest of the Folketing, have no extensive service apparatus to call upon in the Folketing itself. That is a lack that gives the government the best cards.

The opposition, therefore, feels itself obliged to "go out shopping" to get some of the government's calculations checked. For this purpose they make use in varying degrees of the Agricultural Council, the Employers' Association, the Artisans' Council, the Industry Council, etc. The radical link to the small-holders is also always intact.

In the last phase of negotiations on the short-term housing compromise, which is connected with the May agreements, concrete calculations confirmed the agreement between the figures the government had gotten from its officials and the calculations on the same subject by the Artisans' Council. But it is far from every time that there is agreement. Especially with regard to support of industry, the government has attached weight to having the organizations with it in setting the priorities, so as to "carry the table with it" when the implementation takes place.

There has been no agreement between the government and the compromise parties on new interventions during the term of the agreement, but they may come by next spring in connection with the wage agreement renewals, all depending on the course of events and how far Denmark is from the abyss.

It is evident that an effort is being made to hold together until the expiration of the compromise period on 31 December 1981. "After that time--but not before--Anker Jørgensen can repeal the law of gravity if he wants to," says one politician who has taken part in the deliberations.

Jacobsen's Growth Rate

The discussions in the last few weeks have dealt a great deal with details. The prime minister has been kept continuously informed, but for the government it is Svend Jacobsen, minister of finance, that has found the compromises and drawn the conclusions. He has been the constant figure and has sat at the end of the table when the ministers for specific fields were involved. Normally politicians do not praise their opposite numbers, but there are words of appreciation from the compromise parties for Svend Jacobsen's way of negotiating. He has grown with his missions, it is said, as compared to the time when as minister of fisheries he concerned himself with fish traps and the dimensions of nets.

During the coming winter each of the three small compromise parties will certainly be telling its voters that it has been engaged in pulling the government in *their* direction. But will this be a Christiansborg version of the old tale of the mice that follow the elephant over the Marble Bridge and burst out, "Oh, how we rumble!"?

Each for itself, the Radical Liberals, the Center Democrats, and the Christian People's Party feel that in the last political round they have gotten at least something into their knapsacks:

The Radical Liberals note that the word "solidarity" *does not* occur in the legislative catalog's section on compulsory distribution of surplus profits. Purely concretely the party points to the fact that in the housing agreement with the government they got a promise included of 700 cooperative housing units with rent subsidy, that 60 million kroner is being saved by reducing the rate of expansion of the Copenhagen airport at Kastrup, that a planned raise in freight rates on DSB [Danish State Railways] trains and ferries has been given up, and that arrangements for debt settlement in farming have been started. And it is also considered an advantage that they have been sitting at the table a little longer than the other two.

The Center Democrats have gotten agreement that a planned increase in postal rates cannot be effected at the moment *for psychological reasons*, that the amount of

rent shall remain the same in kroner and ører in 1981 as in 1980, even if a new evaluation comes next year, that a planned stamp tax on deeds and mortgages is given up, that the employers will not have to pay support for the first day's unemployment, that the basic amount of the national old-age pension will not be disturbed, and that there will be a compensation for maintenance of owner-occupied homes. The CD [Center Democrats] had wanted the appropriation of 275 million kroner (employment effect 8,200) as a deduction, but at the demand of the Social Democrats and Radical Liberals there will be a subsidy arrangement.

The Christian People's Party made it clear early that if teachers' colleges were shut down they would not engage in the negotiations at all. The shutting down of teachers' colleges was averted, but there will be a certain thinning out in the professional course offerings and the size of departments. With regard to agriculture, the party concerned itself with debt settlement and claims its part of the credit for the fact that two normal instalment arrangements have been changed to a 6 percent credit union loan for 16 years and the provisional rules for capital finding fees are being relaxed. The party would only support the increase in the quota for general-purpose housing from 7,000 to 10,000 in 1981 because the subsidy arrangement for maintenance was incorporated in the housing agreement. The argument was that expansion of interest-guaranteed, general-purpose construction would especially benefit employment in the larger housing associations.

Each of the negotiating parties has had its own interests in mind during the discussions. Thus it was the small rural artisans in Ringkøbing County that had the support of the Christian party leader Chr. Christensen when the housing agreement was reached. But he would rather--as would the CD--have seen maintenance expenses entitled to deduction and not to subsidies.

8815

ISO: 3106

NORTH SEA FIELDS TO PROVIDE UP TO 30-40 PERCENT OF ENERGY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Oct 80 p 5

[Article by Peter Kjelstrup]

[Text] These days billions of kroner's worth of building blocks are being stacked up on a steel skeleton as big as big as Round Tower with the aid of a gigantic crane. Beside it the drilling platform Mærsk Explorer has thrust its long leg 38 meters down into the sea-floor and stretched upward so high above the surface of the water that even the biggest waves could not reach the drill hole on the deck, from which the drill is working its way down into the bottom of the North Sea.


Two to three kilometers down it makes sufficiently numerous holes in the chalk to wrest from the chalk formations some of the oil that the biological processes of thousands of years have deposited in a pocket under one of the harshest sea regions in the world. The Gorm field is being developed.

If everything works out as planned, in the course of the next year Denmark will arrive at an extra annual oil production of the same size as that which 8 years ago was successfully wrested from Denmark's first oil field, the Dan field.

Two million tons of oil a year, or about 12 percent of the country's annual oil consumption. The first substantial contribution to an energy-hungry population after DUC [Danish Underground Consortium] has tried for years to squeeze the complicated chalk stratum under the Dan field for more oil.

But the Gorm field is only the first part of an investment plan totaling 8 billion kroner over the next 5 years. An investment plan that among other things will ensure an annual production of natural gas that may correspond to another 12 to 15 percent of the Danish oil consumption. A project that from 1984 on will put the names Gorm and Tyra something besides names in the history books. Tyra will be queen of the gas project, as Gorm will be the king of oil. And with these two as the focal points, a row of less important historic leaders may possibly have new life breathed into them. Roar, Igor, Skjold, Adda, Niels, Arne, and the most recently discovered, Lulu. Smaller fields, which since the doubling of the price of oil during the last few years and with a gas pipeline out to the queen, are acquiring new possibilities.

For the time being, Roar is a part of the gas project already decided upon. And an application to prospect for oil from Skjold is before the authorities for




This is how the plans for the North Sea look at the moment. The Dan field has produced oil for several years. The Gorm field will begin by 1 January 1981. Tyra and Roar will be ready to supply natural gas from 1984 on.

approval. If the answer comes quickly, it may perhaps be possible to erect an unmanned production platform in the field between Dan and Gorm by summer, in the period known in North Sea talk as "the window." The summertime, when it is possible to work with such things in the waves of the North Sea. An extra supply of 100,000 to 150,000 tons of oil a year can thus be fed into the Dan and Gorm pipeline. New prospecting at Adda is planned, when still further attempts are made to wring oil out of the Dan field more rapidly. As of now 33 test wells have been drilled in the Dan field, which is perhaps the biggest disappointment in the whole North Sea area. The chalk is simply so dense that the oil cannot flow properly. New experiments with forcing the gas back into the field to put pressure on the oil are now being tried. And new drillings, which by a new technique run horizontally instead of more or less vertically, will also be tried.

The new find Lulu is being appraised at the moment. Nearly twice as much gas as oil is the only result known thus far. And when study of the samples is finished, it will be decided whether more drilling is to be done here, on the border of the Norwegian area.

The other small fields are similarly being taken up for new appraisal. The new prices, and not least the fact that it is now feasible to connect the fields with the gas project and thus recover the gas that is always present in an oil field, may make a number of them possible contributors at the little end of the scale.



Construction of the gas net around Tyra offers new possibilities for exploitation of smaller oil and gas finds in the North Sea. The result of over a hundred test drillings both on dry land and on the sea-floor.

New technical achievements also play a part. In the future it may possibly be quite feasible to recover oil from a field that is not big and productive enough to bear the costs of proper platforms and pipes. Special tank ships with a vacuum line down to the sea-floor are under development. Ships that simply anchor above the field and tap it for what has flowed into the well and then sail away to the next field. There are also underwater installations of modest size for use where needed. The final vacuuming of the sea-floor for the precious drops of oil is coming closer and closer.

High-Quality Slesvig Oil

At Løgumkloster the first drilling ever on solid Danish ground with traces of oil and gas has just been completed. And hopes for the next good results are now turning toward Tønder. Public interest in these drillings has run high. It is, so to speak, real Danish oil. But even if it should turn out that oil or gas can be recovered from the fields here, nobody expects that on that account Denmark will send in an application for membership in the OPEC. It will hardly cause a flicker of the pointer on the Danish oil import gauge. But it may contribute to

making us aware that although we can by no means be compared to the new oil giants of Europe--Norway and England--we are really well on the way to getting a quite nice slice of our energy needs covered by oil and gas from the North Sea.

And even if the amounts of oil, from the global point of view, belong in the decimals in the "other countries" category, and the expectation that we may move out of that category with a single super find can only get us a friendly nod from international oil geologists, there are a lot of things to rejoice over. And one of them is that the oil is of superfine quality. Lots of precious things like gasoline and heating oil and minimal amounts of sulfur are two of them. That means among other things that while the yardstick, so-called Arabian light oil, costs \$32 a barrel today, the price of North Sea oil is about 15 percent higher.

On the other hand, there are also things that are vexing. Among them is the fact that the oil is in the troublesome chalk stratum. That means that only a small part of the oil actually in the fields can be gotten out. The Dan field is the worst. Some 200 million tons of oil, or enough for the entire Danish energy requirements for 10 years, is locked up down there in the chalk. Possibly 9 million tons can be brought up.

Dynamite blasting and blowing in sand and other expensive methods have already been tried without success. Dan is not disposed to turn the oil loose.

The Gorm field's 100 million tons of oil, on the other hand, is somewhat more cooperative. Present estimates indicate a total production over the next 20 years of between 15 and 20 million tons. A single year's energy needs for Denmark today.

Negotiations About Unknown Amounts

Whether the efforts these days to wring oil out of the North Sea are maximal is one of the things the government and A.P. Møller are fighting about. Is there significantly more oil and gas in the Danish subsoil? Or will we, by the middle of this decade, be in the situation where production decreases year by year as the pressure goes off the finds? Or will new technical advances make it possible to recover bigger percentages from the microscopic cracks and crevices in the chalk?

By way of comparison, one of the big oil finds in the North Sea, the English Forties, actually contains not much more oil than Dan. 240 million tons. But 43 percent of it can be recovered. And with 4 gigantic platforms, each with 27 wells in a fan out to the sides, it produces 10 times as much oil every day as even the Gorm field can ever produce. More oil than Denmark can ever use. And that is only one of many big finds in the English and Norwegian parts of the North Sea. The Gorm field's twice seven wells, the limping Dan field, and a few small fields at the margin of the economically justifiable do not make Denmark a new oil country. But together with the gas this is still enough to cut Danish oil imports down by about 30 to 40 percent. And taken altogether it is quite warming in a cold time.

8815

CSO: 3106

INDUSTRY COUNCIL PREDICTS 200,000 JOBLESS IN 1981

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Oct 80 p 9

[Article by Frank Dahigaard]

[Text] Unemployment by next year will be marked by over 200,000 registered jobless and a foreign debt of 115 billion kroner by the end of 1981.

Those are the dismal conditions of the Danish economy according to "Prognose 81," just published by the Industry Council. In nearly all fields the situation for next year is expected to be worse than the picture the government presented last week in its financial report.

The Industry Council's economists assumed in their 1981 prognosis that there would be no intervention with economic policy measures beyond what has already been announced. It is further assumed that we shall escape a third oil crisis and that the economic growth in West Europe will remain at only 0.5 percent from 1980 to 1981.

On these assumptions unemployment, which is estimated this year at 170,000, will presumably rise to more than 200,000 in 1981, in spite of the fact that the aid to construction just decided upon by the government is estimated to increase employment by 10,000 to 18,000 persons. The effects of the government's aid to construction are thus included in the Industry Council's prediction, which, nevertheless, shows alarming results.

In the government's financial report the 1981 unemployment is estimated to reach 195,000, but that estimate was made before the decision on more aid to construction. With the effects of that aid included, the government's appraisal would thus mean a 1981 unemployment of "only" 180,000 to 185,000.

35,000 Jobs Lost

The Industry Council expects a decline in private consumption by 1 percent next year in addition to a 3 percent decline this year. Public consumption, on the other hand, continues to increase, albeit at a lower rate. As a consequence of this development, no fewer than 35,000 jobs will be closed out in the coming year in the private sector, while 25,000 new jobs are established with the state and with the municipal governments. These figures are in glaring contrast to the government's financial report, which contains an estimate of only 4,000 fewer employed in the private sector next year.

FORECASTS FOR 1981	WISE MEN 20 May	OECD 1 JULY	GOVERNMENT 8 October	INDUSTRY 14 October
UNEMPLOYMENT				
Number of Persons	197,000	185,000	195,000	200,000
EXCHANGE DEFICIT				
Billions of kroner	-17.8	-18-20	-15.5	-17
PRICE INCREASE				
1980-1981	+8.3%	+11%	+9.5%	+10%
ECONOMIC GROWTH				
1980-1981	+1.1%	+1.25%	+0.9%	0
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION				
Growth 1980-1981	+0.6%	+1%	-0.5%	-1%

The government has the brightest appraisal of the exchange deficit this year among the economic forecasts.

The industry economists are counting on a 1 percent drop in the national product in 1980 and then a 1981 national product at the same level as this year. In other words, it is a question of *zero growth* in the Danish economy next year.

It is first and foremost the trend in exports and industrial investments that is appraised more pessimistically by the Industrial Council than by the government economists. Industrial exports are expected to grow by only 2 percent from 1980 to 1981, against 6 percent this year and 10 percent last year.

Investments in industry are expected to drop in 1981 for the fifth year in a row. Housing construction in 1981 is also expected to be at a lower level than during the current catastrophic year. The Industrial Council is counting on a continued high interest level in 1981 and a further small drop in disposable real incomes (buying power of incomes after taxes).

The deficit in balance of payments (exchange deficit) is estimated at 17 billion kroner both this year and next year, while the government expects a deficit this year of 18.5 billion kroner and 15.5 billion kroner for next year. The Industrial Council indicates that the depression in the Danish economy now will lead to an improvement in the balance of payments during the rest of 1980. But when the raw material stocks are built back up imports will increase and the deficit will rise again.

The Industrial Council states that the increase in taxes on the economy in December 1979 came at a very unfortunate time, when the downward trend in the Danish economy was already developing. The December taxes have sharpened that downward trend, the Industrial Council says.

8815

CSO: 3106

DETENTE SEEN CAUSING REFORMS IN EAST EUROPE

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 2 Oct 80 p 9

[Article by Karsten D. Voigt: "Only Alteration Solves Conflicts"]

[Text] In November, the second follow-up conference of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] convenes in Madrid--an occasion for recollecting the basic ideas of the policy of detente. And for determining more closely its significance with respect to human rights and domestic societal change.

The European policy of detente unquestionably has had two effects: Mutual respect on the part of all European governments as signatories, and increasing cooperation between the states of West and East Europe. This development has exposed certain domestic societal inconsistencies with prevailing political and cultural ideas. In West Europe, it has been possible to integrate these to a large extent as inducements toward reforms, but in East Europe they have been driven, so to speak, into a fundamental opposition to the system because of the rigid social structure in these countries.

If the domestic opposition in East Europe were to turn into a threat to the system for the governments of the respective countries, then if anything one could expect reversions back to increased repressions at home, a sharpened disassociation from the outside, and reverses in detente and cooperation policy as an accelerated liberalization. For this reason, German social democrats cannot also gamble on uprisings in East Europe, in the interests of strengthened East-West cooperation, in the interests of the people in East Europe, and in the interests of the development of a stable peacetime order in Europe. Rather, in the interests of reforms and the capacity for reforms, they support the degree of stability required for this purpose. This fundamental attitude is meeting with a lack of understanding and criticism among many civil-rights activists in East Europe.

Increased disassociation efforts on the part of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw-Pact states represent their attempt to get control of the consequent effects of increased cooperation and communication between East and West Europe. These greater disassociation efforts are also the result of the general cooling off of the East-West climate.

Structural Susceptibility to Crises in the States of East Europe

Social democrats cannot approve of these disassociation efforts by the states of the Warsaw Pact. For reasons of their democratic credibility alone, social

democrats must make clear in public also their own fundamental solidarity and sympathy with movements for the realization of human rights and for the domestic societal democratization--wherever they occur.

But at the same time, social democrats must not overlook the fact that not only in the states of East Europe does a disassociation campaign--in those countries, against capitalistic and social-democratic views--accompany the detente and cooperation process. In parallel with the introduction of the policy of detente, the SPD also has sharpened domestically its disassociation from the ideological sympathizers with its other contracting parties to the policy of detente, with the Munich party council resolution and with the premier's decree. There would be few objections to such a disassociation, if it were not imposed with the help of governmental repressions.

To the extent that the detente policy supports a constructive argument about communist, democratic-socialist, and capitalist theory and practice, this can only be welcomed. But it is becoming apparent that governmental and party apparatuses are shunning the risks of a critical dialog, and in many cases are preferring governmental repressions. However, in East Europe the fear of the risks of a critical dialog, the inclination toward the disassociation of the system and toward compelling this disassociation by means of repressive measures are evidently incomparably greater than in West Europe. This is due to a structurally constituted susceptibility to crises in the political system of the states of East Europe.

Up to now, the social systems of East Europe have not been able to integrate contradictions in the society into their system and moreover to use them in a positive way as an inducement towards processes of change, because of their definition of socialism--and although the hopeful developments in the Polish Peoples Republic are opening up a new way, the final verdict is not yet in on this. Thus, criticism of any outmoded social institution, of any economically obsolete structure, of any traditional culture, tends to turn into a criticism of the system as a whole.

But at the same time, for structural reasons the suppression of this criticism in the societies of East Europe leads to a deficiency of innovation, to a deficiency of democracy, to a deficiency of loyalty on the part of the population, and to a likewise structurally conditioned susceptibility to crises, which is disproportionately great in comparison to West-European societies, due to organized opposition minorities, accompanied by a tendency toward overreaction on the part of the representatives of governmental and social power.

If now in the process of an increasing detente and cooperation between East and West Europe the technical communication systems and the economic, cultural, and political relations between East and West Europe are improved, then concurrently a pluralism with respect to information and opinions gradually will become a social reality in East Europe. If the governments of East Europe do not legitimize and integrate this increasing de facto opinion and information pluralism as a component of their social systems, the effect of the emerging pluralism in their social reality increasingly will articulate and organize itself as a contradiction to the political systems. In the short run, repression can create "peace in the land" again, but it does not solve this conflict and indeed only sharpens it in the long run.

Every attempt of the governments of East Europe to block the political repercussions of an increased East-West cooperation by seeking to confine the widening of relations within certain sectors, chiefly in the economic sphere, is impeded in the long run by the technical development of communication systems, the compass of these relations, and the difficulty of limiting communication to certain social groups, sectors, and regions. For this reason alone, an increase in East-West economic relations and an improvement of the East-West technical communication possibilities will also have repercussions in the sphere of cultural and human relations. The inclination observable among some political figures in West Europe to view this process exclusively in connection with advances with respect to "Basket 3" (humanitarian and cultural cooperation) of the CSCE Final Act is fallacious, since what is involved here is a direct procedural connection among advances in all areas of the CSCE Final Act.

Not only many political figures in West Europe and the United States, but also many civil-rights activists in East Europe overlook the inner-relationship between the strategic, economic, and technical-scientific, and the humanitarian and cultural areas of the policy of detente. Many fail to appreciate in particular the necessity for a detente and cooperation process which is geared to the long term.

Democratic socialists, the SPD as a party and social democrats in government posts, have never as yet made any secret of the fact that their detente policy, besides the securing of peace, also serves to promote greater democracy and more social equity in Europe. Therefore, they also protest against human rights violations and make common cause with democratic civil-rights movements. But for this reason, they must also intensify their efforts to continue and develop the policy of detente between the states and the representatives of social power in Europe.

The United States and the USSR Set the Basic Conditions

For further advances, detente policy in Europe needs not only the support of public opinion, the support of the relevant social groups. It needs also the active commitment of the governments as well as the readiness of the United States and the USSR to continue and improve the process of detente. The governments in the East and West and the political figures of the United States and the USSR still determine here the basic conditions for the possibilities of action by the European governments. But these are prepared to continue and expand the detente process only if this can still be brought sufficiently into line with the interests and principles which they have defined at a particular concrete period of time to be "their" interests and "their" principles.

When in eruptive crises the criticism of social conditions seems to fundamentally jeopardize inner stability, this impedes advances in detente policy. Here, "revolutionary" crises which lead to violent conflicts hinder the long-range reform process and even foster a hardening of social attitudes and reactions against the process of domestic societal democratization and humanization.

A necessary condition accepted on both sides for advances in detente and cooperation policy between East and West Europe is not the mutual abandonment of principles, but an agreeing on more cooperation together with the maintenance of differing and antagonistic principles. A reformist concept of detente must incorporate these contradictory interests and principles in a constructive process which leads

to a peacetime order which is no longer characterized by antagonistic military blocs and growing military expenditures, which leads to more democracy and social equity, without it happening that on the way to this development any force which is relevant to the success of this process views its interests as being fundamentally threatened.

Whoever wants to reach this goal more abruptly and quickly will soon discover that he has ended up in a political blind alley. For this reason, social democrats are holding fast to the policy of detente, in the interests of securing peace and in the interests of the realization of human rights.

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CBO: 3103

SPD MAGAZINE SEES NEED FOR NEW ATLANTICIST INSTITUTIONS

Bonn DIE NEUE GESELLSCHAFT in German Sep 80 pp 795-799

[Article by Ernst-Otto Czempel: "The United States and the Europeans"]

[Excerpts] In America, one is more likely to speak today of the "Europeans" rather than of the allies. This is due not only to the film of the same name which is presently being shown in American motion-picture theaters and which shows the intrusion of a European couple into the pastoral idylls of the United States of the 19th century. It is also due--of this there can be no doubt--to a certain detachment. In addition to the shock of the lost Vietnam War, of inflation, of unemployment, and of their (supposed) loss of power in the world, the Americans could not help noticing that the Europeans have been regarding themselves as not exclusively the allies of the United States, that on the old continent not only do quite a few things function differently, but also many things function even better than on the new one. America is casting a watchful, occasionally even a skeptical glance toward Europe, which for its part regards many things in the United States with a critical eye. There are reasons for that on both sides. America has the impression of having been left in the lurch by the Europeans in connection with the hostage affair in Iran; likewise in Afghanistan, where the Europeans only half-heartedly supported the hard American line, and even took the sting out of this line in the matter of the Olympic boycott. Whereas the American President ignored his Soviet counterpart and in this way sought to isolate him, first the French president, then the German Federal Chancellor paid him a visit. That had to look like a pointed action, even though it had not been meant that way and the German side had even explained that it was not this. On their part, the Europeans are annoyed at the fact that they are not consulted in connection with important decisions of the Americans, neither in the Olympic boycott nor in the Iran crisis, and not even in the now doubtlessly common cause of the new American strategy toward the Soviet Union. Nowadays we can add to that the agitations of the election year, in the United States as well as in the Federal Republic. Many noises are heard, drums are played, fanfares are sounded. They are trying to create the impression that America and Europe have fallen out of step, that dissonances have replaced the harmony of former times. Although this is not true, it is also not entirely false. Something has changed in American-European relations; they are no longer what they were in the 1950's and 1960's, and by no means can they be. The atmosphere has changed, interests have multiplied and shifted. The traditional connecting link, NATO, is no longer enough.

It is easy for these attitudinal problems to captivate the public's attention. But looked at objectively, they are of only minimal importance. For the American

elites it is naturally difficult to part with a view of the world in which they were the undisputed occupiers of the highest rank. Today, they are still the strongest power in the world militarily as well as economically, but they are no longer the only power. Europe has closed the gap, as has the Soviet Union. In the Third World, new centers of power are appearing. America is not weaker, but the rest of the world is stronger, has become more differentiated. It is calling for a different kind of behavior, is demanding also of the strongest world power, if not cooperation then surely a cooperative attitude, is demanding a readiness to compromise, a considerateness instead of giving orders and having priority.

It is difficult for those in the United States to get used to this, and least of all can the governing elites around the president do this. They are shifted around frequently, have neither experience nor training in the political-diplomatic sector, and they have their hands full in finding their way about and being successful in the sphere of American domestic policy, which to them is paramount.

The United States is a continent to itself, a world of the gigantic, whose political system is entirely underdeveloped on the federal level. Its guidance requires every attention, and for the rest of the world there is not much left. And America is strong enough to be able to afford this neglecting of the outside world. The others have to adjust, not the United States. That is still true today, but more and more it is becoming an expensive luxury.

In the future, America also will have to adjust, less than its friends, but more than formerly. With that, the attitudinal problems in the American-European sphere would disappear by themselves. The lesson to be learned is neither great nor difficult, and a new Carter administration, at least, would probably also manage it. Carter's first secretary of state, Vance, already formulated it after his withdrawal: "What we must convey is a readiness for consultation and for accommodation, for the sake of accord in the alliance." If those in Washington would just set their minds on no longer being master in their own house but rather the first among equals, the atmosphere would improve considerably, and the numerous "irritations" which Federal Chancellor Schmidt has been noting for a long time now in American-European relations would quickly disappear.

What remains are the differences in interests. They have an entirely different significance from those "irritations," and also they cannot be eliminated easily. However, before one evokes them one must first of all define them. Here also what is significant above all is the fact that the world of today is no longer that of 1950 or 1960. The East-West conflict no longer takes up the entire political arena; to the interests of defense have been added other interests, economic, even political interests. A de-Europeanized, multipolar world no longer can be expressed in terms of the stipulated agreements of a military alliance, and it need not be so expressed. For a long time now, American-European relations have gone beyond the "alliance," by means of which accordingly they can be defined only in part.

This is quite natural and in no way any kind of crisis. Of course, NATO continues to be the focus of American-European relations; but no longer can it completely cover them. In the long term, here lies the point of crucial importance concerning these relations.

However, for the short and intermediate term the question also arises of whether in those East-West relations which the alliance covers an identity of interests

still prevails. Is the United States turning away from detente with the Soviet Union? Is it going back to the days of confrontation? If this were the case, then in fact a divergence of interests would appear in the midst of the American-European community. Because for all their differences, the West Europeans see no alternative to detente, and they want to continue it. It is precisely this which no longer seems to be a certainty in America; is the United States abandoning detente?

The American President is not a monarch; he must move in a social context which is greater and more experienced than he and his colleagues. He can try to influence it, but he cannot compel it.

Therefore, the progress of the American policy of detente is determined neither by the president alone, nor by his security advisers. Rather, it depends on the development of the inter-American constellation of interests, on the interests of the economy, the labor unions, the large social groups, the minorities, and finally on the power center of the congress.

For the Europeans it happens to be the case that they really have no organized access at all to these important decision-making factors of American politics and foreign policy. They have only NATO, which in view of the developments must be compared to a straw on whose two ends hang two large soap bubbles. Their behavior cannot be harmonized by way of this narrow channel alone. Put in other, political terms: The American-European relationship suffers from the fact that it has only the military alliance as the sole organizational clamp. This was sufficient in the 1940's and 1950's, because the economic interests of America and Europe were closely related to one another, and in the OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation] they even had an institutionalized linkage. Thus at a time when everything was very much simpler, America and Europe had quite a lot more points of contact than today, when interests have widened and differentiated.

NATO cannot accommodate the required lines of relationship. There, one cannot negotiate either about the European and the American Middle-East policy, or about the American-European interests in Africa--just to mention only two examples. Misunderstandings can develop, can widen to differences of opinion and to divergences of interests, if they are not negotiated. Surely it must rate almost as an anachronism that although the United States and Europe have a military alliance in order to face a defensive disaster, they have no economic alliance and no developmental alliance for solving the problem of the world economy and the problem of the Third World.

The existing institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund or the OECD, are not sufficient, they are too large and too weak. The communist countries have maintained the "Council for Economic Mutual Assistance," whereas on the Western side the OEEC, after it had served its purpose, was converted into the OECD and with that was phased out in certain respects. But such an organization would institutionally express the great degree of interdependence between America and Europe, it would give this interdependence a framework within

which differences of opinion and of interests which appeared could be discussed and ironed out. It would also serve as the place where both sides could discuss the economic aspects of detente and in this way could exert a mutual influence on one another. In any case, in this way it would be possible to avoid the emergence in the economic area of strains on American-European relations, which would have a much more serious effect than differences of opinion about detente with the Soviet Union.

But even in the area of policy in the narrower sense, NATO is no longer sufficient. To be sure, there are the summit conferences of the Western states; they are a step forward. But this improvement is only a small one, inasmuch as it is limited to the government leaders and to the great international economic problems. What is lacking is organized and regular cooperation on the cabinet and ministerial level. In Europe, there is the European Political Cooperation, an informal, but intensive cooperation effort of the foreign ministries. Would it be so unthinkable to bring into this also the American Department of State, to enlarge the European Political Cooperation to make it the Atlantic Political Cooperation? Would it be so far-fetched to organize on a regular basis something similar in the sector of the economy, among the economic and financial ministries? Above all, would it not be advisable to bring into contact more the members of the legislatures of both sides?

But the conferences of the NATO parliamentarians are not a substitute for a regular, organized exchange of opinions among the peoples' representatives. America and Europe have a great deal more in common than defense against the Soviet Union. They have common economic, political, and social interests--for all their diversity, for all their differences. Their common interests will have to be realized in a world which is absorbed only minimally by military conflict in the Atlantic area. Thereby in no way has the East-West conflict been put to rest--on the contrary: It has taken on worldwide dimensions. It could even be the case that the East-West conflict is really beginning just now--as a globalization of the conflict between two social and economic systems.

This common interest cannot be attained any longer by a military alliance, and it cannot be reached any longer by armament alone. New problems cannot be solved by old, outdated patterns of behavior.

It must even be asked whether the continuance of detente makes up the focus of the American-European relations and their "irritations." It is an important issue, surely an extremely important issue in view of the dangerousness of every alternative. But it is no longer the sole issue, and in the intermediate term not the most decisive one. Whoever is concerned and worried about American-European relations must make adjustments for that fact. With their one-dimensional organization, they will have no success in a multidimensional world. Rather, they must develop a complex relational structure which corresponds to the complexity of these relations.

Undoubtedly, the Atlantic community does not constitute a real community; there are no identical interests in America and Europe, and not even within Europe. But compatible interests, parallel, complementary, even identical interests

do exist. They need cultivation, need regular contacts, need reciprocal information. Otherwise, comprehensiveness becomes scattered, it melts away. On the other hand, if it is institutionalized informally on many levels, it can at the same time ease the load on the only institution hitherto existing, namely NATO. Up to now, whoever has been interested in the maintenance of American-European relations has to strengthen NATO, because it comprises the sole connecting device. If there were several such devices, NATO could be confined to its defensive function in the narrowest sense. That would be to the benefit of detente, which is always impaired whenever the military alliance is emphasized, because of its connecting function. If there were several such institutions, this would serve not only the practical areas affected by them, but also detente. Western policy could become more flexible, more effective.

America and Europe cannot go into the 1980's with NATO alone. To devise forms of organization which correspond to the great degree of interdependence between America and Europe in many spheres, which express interdependence but which are not confining--that is the challenge to policy and to political theory. The response to this contains the key to the future of American-European relations.

12114

CSO: 3103

BORDER FORCES TIGHTEN WATCH TO STEM SOVIET DEFECTIONS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Oct 80 p 5

[Report by Tor Högnäs, DAGENS NYHETER correspondent]

[Text] Helsinki, Saturday [25 Oct]--Finland has tightened up its watch at the border with the Soviet Union in the neighborhood of Salla and also farther into the country. The reason is that many Soviet citizens have succeeded lately in getting across to Sweden. The Russians believe that there is a secret route with regular stops where people help the refugees. Officially it is given out that the watch is tightened up to supervise the elk hunting.

A recent case has disturbed the public. In Sotkamo 3 weeks ago the authorities seized a man who had come over from the Soviet Union. He was sent back because he "had no residence permit for Finland."

Now the question has been raised in a simple question addressed to the government by J. Juhani Korttesalmi, a Rural Party member of the Riksdag.

Cars Stopped

"The case is disturbing and harmful to Finland's international esteem," says Korttesalmi. He asks why the Russian refugee was not given a residence permit in accordance with the provisions of the Helsinki Accord.

Many are beginning to wonder what is happening on the eastern border after a report in the newspaper ILTA-SANOMAT on Saturday.

Patrol cars are running day and night in Salla. Officially it is given out that the patrols are supervising the elk hunting. But nobody believes the explanation. All cars are stopped; the patrolmen ask to see hunting licenses, but they search carefully to see that no extra passenger is hidden anywhere.



- 1 Sweden
- 2 Soviet Union
- 3 Gulf of Bothnia
- 4 Helsinki
- 5 Lake Ladoga
- 6 Lake Onega

The patrol is especially effective on a forest road that runs parallel to the boundary between Tulppio and Naruska road fork near Salla center. At Naruska road fork several of the refugees have been seen trying to get into the country.

The tightened watch set in 3 weeks ago after a consultation with the Soviet border authorities, according to Col Jarmo Mattila, commander of the Lapland border guard.

He says that control has also been tightened up farther inside the country.

"But the patrols only have to do with hunting. There are so many poachers this year," the colonel points out.

According to the Finnish security police, SÄPO, there are about 50 illegal border crossings by individuals every year. They occur in both directions.

As a rule it is "drunk or crazy" persons that try to get across the border, a spokesman for the border guard explains.

The security police muzzle all who have come in contact with the Russian refugees. Seppo Tiitinen, chief of the security police, explains that this is necessary for reasons of "national security." If the disposal of individual cases were made public it would not further Finland's security efforts, he says.

The security police "muzzle" can be extremely effective. That was observed in connection with the Swede Göran Wickenbergh's attempt to fly members of Agapov's family across. On that occasion a whole town, Purnujärvi, on the eastern border, was silenced.

8815

CSO: 3109

FOREIGN POLICY INFLUENCES ON DOMESTIC COALITION GOVERNMENT

Paris LE FIGARO in French 10 Oct 80 p 2

[Article by Pierre Emmanuel: "What Will the New Majority Be?"]

[Text] A majority that is coming apart, a dislocated opposition, uncertainty among men and confusion in the ideas of two parties which, starting from different positions and without daring to say so, are painfully seeking a new path and an opening to different partners: This is the state of the political world, to be followed by the world of opinion and sooner than one might think.

Public opinion is beginning to realize with some uneasiness -- Friday's attempt may expose the feeling -- what it had already unconsciously accepted, to wit, that this country has no direction. Resignation in the face of the real problems is not only characteristic of Parliament; it stems from a national passivity, passivity against a background of anguish, maintained by a style of authority both doctoral and reassuring. But style is not authority, even when it commands obedience in circumstances heretofore reduced to economic theorems. We have gone from theorem to theorem, index to index, increase to increase in the price of gas and the number of unemployed, until this augural autumn of the unveiling of another face of politics, another measure of the national destiny.

In retrospect, the years we have just lived through, seen from the French angle, will appear totally out of proportion with the extent of the planetary changes manifested everywhere. The evidence of a Soviet thrust and its world missionary nature, a myth only for Westerners, have quite simply been forgotten by rulers haunted by the energy shortage. The most incredible event, when the balance sheet of this 7-year period has been drawn up, will be the casual way in which the government has allowed Ayatollah Khomeyni to turn France on a global scale into chaos whose consequences are only beginning to be seen. And yet, symptomatically enough, public opinion as a whole has scarcely noticed.

All the soothing images have been resorted to to express a certain state of opinion and the means to maintain it. The word "destabilization" is one of these images, which still evokes stability behind the appearance of chaos. In recent years, the French vocabulary has been considerably enriched -- if that is the proper word -- by such neologisms. Politics has become a chapter on terminology. We know the favor which the word "detente" enjoyed at the time when the Soviets were entering Kabul and when the Afghan resisters were being called rebels by the authorized spokesmen. On the eve of the Madrid conference, that same word needs a meaning

which, behind a decent screen, will make a new edition of the comedy of the dupes of Helsinki possible. A comedy of dupes or the dupery of Western public opinion by its own leaders? Even Marie-France Garaud had the chance to recall that at Helsinki, detente was mainly in the interest of business.

Does one have to bring up another comedy, the Olympic Games? The Games, whose flame had gone out long before arriving in Moscow, were just what they were supposed to be: demoralizing and mediocre. They revealed a lack of courage, a blindness to what is fundamental. The most pitiful or humiliating aspect, depending on how one looks at it, was the way in which the Olympic officials went about sterilizing any traces of their protesters in Moscow. It was during that particularly frightful time for political good sense that Giscard d'Estaing pronounced, concerning the pseudo withdrawal of a few Soviet soldiers, that it was "a step in the right direction."

These things risk coming to mind again all at the same time with the tide, because the tide is rising; that is undeniable. It could well be much more powerful than the official propaganda services, which are everywhere, have wanted anyone to believe in the past year. The economic situation will definitely play a major role in the campaign, but for several weeks, it has seemed that it would not be as important as that of foreign policy or rather, the denunciation -- coming from several sides at once -- of the flagrant lack thereof. On this matter, Mrs Marie-France Garaud summed up a leading idea that seemed to be awaiting its simplest enunciation. She thus raised a question previously repressed by everyone: What will the new majority be?

It is a forbidden question that apparently no one is prepared to ask openly, a question that is no longer a pedantic hypothesis, as is that of the rallying of a leftist faction to the discredited majority of the president. But it is a booby-trapped question, barbed with memories, mired in the ideological debris sown by the collapse of the Joint Program, stymied in the leftist conservatism that has prevented socialism from being completely free in our time. And yet, the only question remains: In the immediate future, what will the new majority be that will not only change the political life, but the dimensions of politics in our country?

One of the cohesive forces of the current majority is the number of deputies that stay with it in order to preserve their seats, although it is far from impossible that Giscard d'Estaing, if reelected, might send them back before their voters on his momentum. It is true that some would then be doubly loyal to him, especially since they would be even further removed from their convictions. However, it is difficult to believe that most of the members of Parliament would prefer keeping their seats to those convictions, for any policy would then become impossible in France, which is already nearly the case. On the contrary, supposing the policy emerging from the morass of election combinations, if a few strong voices awakened by the circumstances should hammer on the same idea, is it conceivable that the double ambiguity on which both the majority and the opposition are still based would drive us straight into the impasse in which we have allowed ourselves to be forced, thereby breaking the destiny of France?

Not being privy to the secrets of the gods, I feel confused by the difference between convictions and action as soon as political strategy is involved. I particularly admire the strange recovery of the drama of Rue Copernic, a national drama if there

is one, benefiting the unity of a left that now has but one issue in common and knows it. But it is now a question of strategy, that one or another. It is a matter of knowing whether France can very quickly give itself a domestic and foreign policy corresponding to its vital conception of democracy and whether from that independent policy there will emerge the necessary alliances to prevent a French-German "neutralization" of continental West Europe. The USSR would look favorably upon such a neutralization and such a prospect may have a subtle effect on the election decisions of the PCF. What is at stake in the presidential election, which will give the government a leader for 7 years, is nothing less than the active defense of all our democratic freedoms. It is high time to understand together what that means.

11,464

CSO: 3100

SNECMA DEPUTY DIRECTOR INTERVIEWED ON COMPANY'S FUTURE

Paris AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL in French 1-14 Oct 80 p 23

[Interview with Jean Sollier deputy director of SNECMA (National Company for the study and construction of Aircraft Motors); date and place not given]

[Text] As an opening to the Farnborough Salon you attended a colloquium in London on the subject of "Aerospace in the 1980s and beyond." You believe that the structure of the motor industry will change considerably in the next 10 to 20 years. In what sense?

[Answer] These structures result from technical objectives to be achieved and from market demands. These objectives have evolved. For instance, in 1970 the main technical objective was to reduce engine noise levels. Today, the objective is to reduce fuel consumption and to prepare for use of new fuels (such as hydrogen) within a few years. Today's objective is also to use presently available fuels with broadened specifications.

We know several ways to meet these objectives. There will not be any revolution. Basically, there is nothing comparable to the double flux motor of the 60s. The main thing will be to keep on making steady progress, tightly connected with materials and ways in which they will be altered. And it is with this last point which I believe we will see new structures. It is quite possible that machining mills will see their project load drastically reduced in favor of forges and foundries.

[Question] You think that European industry is far from the place it could hope for in the world market. What means can the European use to reach that place?

[Answer] This is a difficult question. It is a fact that the European motor industry has not yet been able to sell on the world market the equivalent of the European fleet. This is roughly equal to 1 to 2. We are far from a balance. There is no miraculous solution. Europeans must not only offer products adapted to needs of the market and sell them, but also they must offer satisfactory maintenance service. This will require time: 10, perhaps even 20 years will be necessary to build the trust of clients.

Political measures such as import restrictions must be avoided. This is certainly not the right way to develop competition.

[Question] Are the ambitions of European motor manufacturers related to large co-operative programs? If so, on what basis should cooperation be developed and what role does SNECMA (National Company for the Study and Construction of Aircraft Motors) plan to play?

[Answer] There are many myths connected to cooperation. In the civilian field and on a European level, no motor manufacturer--and this is also true for aircraft manufacturers--can hope to make more than half of his sales on his national or on the European market, in the case of a European partnership.

Which means that when the reason for cooperation is to enlarge possible market distribution, European partnerships are not sufficient. The imperative is to secure transatlantic cooperation. This is especially necessary to penetrate the American market which offers an important potential. And the American market has been proved very difficult to conquer with 100 percent foreign capital.

In SNECMA we chose this formula through a cooperative agreement with General Electric.

[Question] And the military field?

[Answer] Things are entirely different. First, one sells products to one's government, and only after that does one export. This means that commercial successes are tied to national and foreign defense policies. Consequently, as long as European governments will not have come to a durable agreement on a common national defense policy, and on a common export policy, European cooperation will only be an idea.

[Question] Materials and components play a more and more important part in the design and manufacture of motors. What kind of measures do you intend to take on this point to insure independence for your supplies?

[Answer] SNECMA has long been the only motor manufacturer to have a forge and a foundry, both located in Gennevilliers. Today, almost all motor manufacturers tend to create their own means in this field, either by entering into agreements with a forge or foundry, or by a combination of the two approaches.

At SNECMA we have made spectacular progress during the last 10 years in the development of materials. Every year we invest large sums of money for what we call technical progress.

However, these efforts do not insure the independence of our supplies, notably cobalt and titanium. This is a problem which we cannot resolve ourselves. We take some measures and precautions but they have only short- or mid-term impact--4 to 5 years.

In fact, we depend--as do other motor manufacturers--on the French government, but also on many others.

[Question] You wish that airline companies would contribute more substantially to technological investment efforts by the motor manufacturers. But airline companies seem doomed to ever tighter budgets in order to remain competitive. Thus, how could they possibly help?

[Answer] First of all, people will never agree to pay the true costs of mass transport. Thus, to remain competitive, airlines have had to adjust their fares. This is an absurd situation, which sooner or later leads to bankruptcy or nationalization. I certainly understand that they are reluctant to pay increasing prices for engines. However, when one looks at the constant total cost, airlines could pay 5 percent more for an engine, which would lead to a drop in specific consumption equal to 1 percent. The exchange rate is extremely high today, and should allow airlines to pay a normal price. This price would then allow motor manufacturers to invest in and accomplish the technological progress needed by airlines.

8924

CSO: 3100

PCF POLICY ON DISSIDENTS, PSF SEEN INFLEXIBLE

Paris LE POINT in French 13 Oct 80 p 72

[Article by Denis Jeambar: "Comrade Fiszbin's Wrong Road"]

[Text] Tirelessly, since his dismissal from the leadership of the Paris federation 2 years ago, Henri Fiszbin has been calling for a democratic debate within the Communist Party on the options adopted by the leadership. His latest approach is a letter to the Central Committee at the end of September in order to get to be heard at the party's national conference at Nanterre this weekend, which was to name Marchais as the official candidate in the presidential election.

Because the answer was no, Henri Fiszbin took a new step on Friday. In a long article published by LE MONDE, under the title "Wrong Road," he expressed some criticisms that are "intolerable" in the eyes of the party leadership. This expert in communism puts his finger on the trouble that has stopped the machinery of the unity of the left: "The progress of the party's influence," he writes, "is now posed as a veritable preliminary: so long as the voters have not understood that the strength of the PC must increase, no advance toward an effective change will be possible."

This is a strategy of domination--and one that is destructive of the PS [Socialist Party]--and its effects were seen in the senatorial elections. But it is a strategy that the party sometimes has trouble digesting. The proof: the refusal of certain big Communist voters, on Sunday 28 September, to follow the voting orders hostile to the Socialists. But there is little chance of candidate Marchais' changing the line. Furthermore, in his book "L'Espoir au Present" [Hope at the Present], he has replied to Fiszbin and all Communists who might get moody, by writing: "The party's doors are open in both directions."

11267

CSO: 3100

RESEARCH BUDGET FOR 1981 ENVISIONS SIGNIFICANT INCREASE

Paris ELECTRONIQUE ACTUALITIES in French 26 Sep 80 p 3

[Article signed D. L.]

[Text] The 1981 draft Research budget, presented on last 17 September in Paris by Aigrain, the state secretary in charge of Research, envisions 4,445.7 million francs [MF] in program authorizations (up 20.4 percent), 4,197 MF in payment credits and 1,068 MF in new operating measures. This represents an overall increase of 17.7 percent compared with 1980. Qualified by Aigrain as a "good budget," the Research packet proposed for 1981 gives substance to governmental decisions made last year to bring the research effort up to the level of comparable countries (Germany, Japan, the United States). This objective could be reached in 1985; the rate of increase imparted in 1981 would lead, indeed, to a ratio of 2.2 percent of expenditures on research in relation to the French GNP.

The measures drawn up during the Council of Ministers, held in July 1979, on Research concluded that it was necessary to bring the country's effort up to a level comparable with that of the large industrial nations, in terms of ratio of expenditures on research to the GNP, with the creation of corresponding jobs.

Aigrain emphasized that the draft budget for 1981 was the carrying out of this tendency, by specifying that the adjustment rhythm was considerable in program authorizations (up 20.4 percent). Concerning the creation of jobs (625: 410 researchers and 215 engineers, technicians, and administrators), these show an increase of nearly 3 percent compared with this year.

In fact, the overall figures of the draft 1981 budget (12,148.9 MF broken down into 7,703.2 MF in operating credits and 4,445.7 MF in program authorizations) represent the interministerial research package that is to say a part of the expenditures allotted in France in this domain. They involve medium and long term research projects.

To these credits, it is befitting therefore to add, for 1981, those planned for research and the development of large technological programs such as electronuclear (2,962 MF), civil aeronautical (1,700 MF), spatial (1,285 MF), data processing (368MF), solar (65,4MF)... If the credits of the Defense Ministry (11,350 MF of payment credits in 1980) are added, the total sum of budget credits allotted research and development activities is estimated at around 35 billion francs, or 6

percent of the State budget. Finally, by taking into account the share furnished by private enterprises, the rate of the research and development effort could be reckoned at some 50 billion francs.

The increase of 20.4 percent in program authorizations, that is to say investment credits in equipment, is going to result in the modernization of certain laboratories and a special effort in equipment. Among the main sectors that stand to benefit, let us mention the spatial sector (Venus exploration program and use of the Space-lab), the nuclear sector (construction of the TOER-SUPRA thermonuclear fusion reactor), and oceanography (completion of the SM-97 submarine). Let us mention, lastly, that the credits granted the Agency for the Development of Data Processing will rise from 19,2 MF in 1980 to 76 MF next year.

9330

CSO: 3100

DOUBTS, ACCUSATIONS RAMPANT AMONG NATION'S POLICE

Paris LE POINT in French 20 Oct 80 p 129

[Article by Jean Schmitt: "Police: The Great Malaise"]

[Text] Doubts, questions, accusations. Here, an Assembly committee tries to clarify the contradictory statements by antagonistic police officers on the mysterious de Broglie affair. Elsewhere, a judge suspects the police of sabotaging the inquiry into the neo-Nazis. Somewhere else, they are trying to weigh the uncertain stories of the militant policemen of La Fane. Still elsewhere, trade-unionists and minister confront one another in a cold war. In brief, the conflict is broadening from interior to the exterior, and suspicion is spreading over an entire corps.

In the middle, and ultimately responsible, as he should be, Christian Bonnet, minister of interior, is busy trying to keep the lid on a pot in which 110,000 French police officers--some of them very troubled, others discontent, and many both silent and upset by this hullabaloo--are boiling.

One sudden event was to rally them all and symbolize the widespread malaise: the death of a "flic," killed by a fugitive convict on leave--the 13th death in 10 months. The initial self-criticism then soured into a general dispute in which petty arguments and justified complaints are mixed together, blended, sharpened by hierarchy and an awkward desire by officials to wash privately some rather soiled linen that had already been widely displayed to the public.

For matters are involved that are unconnected but all of which end up in successive layers on the desk of the minister, who appears to "endure" his police through the combined assaults of several trade unions and the strange characteristics of several inquiries.

The tragic murder of a policeman should not revive the quarrel between the judiciary side and the police over leave for convicts, because only 1.72 percent of them have ended back in prison. Likewise, the deplorable death of another policeman cannot authorize the police to decide whether or not Mr Bakhtiar should be received in France.

Among the complaints of the other police officers--insufficient equipment, manpower poorly distributed, questionable work--one must distinguish between the overzealous strike over expense statements and the protest against putting uni-

formed policemen into plain clothes for demonstrations. Some of these complaints are corporative, and others derive from civism or deontology. And while all the complaints are addressed to the minister, they do not all have the same significance. Attitudes in the de Broglie affair that are unusual, to say the least, the government's protection of the "LE CANARD ENCHAINE plumbers," or the absence of explanation about the accusation of a judge regarding a relative complacency toward the far right--these are at best serious political blunders by the executive that are feeding suspicion but that are to be distinguished from the gripes about work schedules or days off.

But in reality, it all adds up, for it is still obstinately believed today that, as in the time of Marcellin, the authorities can settle matters by themselves. But this idea should be laid to rest, because one very important fact has changed everything. It escapes Bonnet and all those who might succeed him: there are police unions today that are no longer silent "friendly societies." And these unions, like the others, have options that are much like the average national ones, and with the same excesses, they say loud and clear what they think they should say. Both internal memos and major police options are subject to this process. What was not formerly said is said. This is a good or it is an evil, depending on whether one believes in an obligation of reticence or in the vigorous exercise of trade-union democracy; but it is a fact. In the face of this situation, two attitudes are possible for the government: either let the arguments unfold in the open, as is the case with the judiciary side; or, if one believes that the effectiveness of a corps such as the police can be impaired, try to negotiate "en famille," as in the discreet Ministry of Finance, whose trade unions hardly ever speak out.

For malaise among the police also means malaise of the citizens. But the citizens themselves contribute to this malaise: being a flic is an uncomfortable situation in France. In France one is not, as in the FRG, the undisputed representative of a powerful spectacular machine aided by public opinion; one is not, as in Great Britain, the reassuring bobby who knows the children on his beat and functions as a small-scale peacemaker. Nor is one, as in the United States, an integrated citizen who drinks his coffee in the drug store and comes to partners' meetings in uniform.

In France, one is appealed to and feared, suspected and desired. One is set somewhat apart, and therefore subject to all sorts of malaises.

11267

CSO: 3100

QADHDHAFI ACCUSED OF FINANCING ANTISEMITIC VIOLENCE

Paris LE MONDE in French 8 Oct 80 p 13

[Article: "The President of LICRA Accuses Colonel Qadhafi"]

[Text] On Monday, 6 Oct, Jean Pierre-Bloch, president of the International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism [LICRA], declared he has reason to believe that Colonel Qadhafi, the Libyan chief of state, financed the recent antisemitic violence in Europe. The president of LICRA stated that certain documents seized during searches at the homes of Marc Fredriksen and Pierre Sidos, head of the former FANE [expansion unknown] and director of Oeuvre Francaise respectively, came from Libya. Pierre-Bloch denounced a stockpile of a book entitled, "Jews, Enemies of Our People," with a secret circulation of 40,000 and printing and distribution costs of 1 million francs. As proof, Pierre-Bloch stated that the paper and printing characters used for this book were of Libyan origin.

In response to these allegations, the Movement Against Racism, Anti-Semitism and for Peace [MRAP] recalled that, "for some time now, we have witnessed various maneuvers designed to dodge the administration's responsibility in the rise of racism and fascism." The leaders of the movement continued, "None of those who called last week for 'an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth' and a 'military response,' are working today to divide the protest movement which is challenging government complacency towards the neo-nazi groups." The MRAP added, "They are attempting to create distrust and hostility towards the Arab countries and particularly towards the Palestinians. Here the PLO is accused, there the KGB. The MRAP objects to these partisan operations. It is opposed to all attempts to bring Middle East conflict into France."

For their part, the members of the bureau of Franco-Libyan Friendship indignantly condemned "the horrible Copernic street violence" and deplored that, "at the occasion of this violence, defamatory, irresponsible and unfounded accusations were made against the leaders of the Libyan people." The same day, Ibrahim Souss, representative of the PLO in France, expressed his indignation, "as does the PLO, whenever faced with this type of violence, especially that relating to places of worship, whether they be Moslem, Jewish or Christian." The Association for Franco-Arab Unity called upon the administration for "a show of strength so as to end the escalation of criminal acts which strike almost daily, in similar fashion, both the Jewish community and the Arab community in France."

The board of directors of the Association of North African Students in France, recalling that the North-African student union was the target of racial violence the night of 6-7 May (see LE MONDE, 8 May), "reaffirms its unity with all the victims of racial crimes in France."

ATHENS POLICE ACQUIRE COMPUTER ALARM SYSTEM FOR STORE PROTECTION

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek 16-22 Oct 80 pp 55, 56

[Article by Ilias Malatos]

[Text] The police has at long last acquired an electronic computer! It will be the first time such modern equipment will be used in police work. The police has another similar computer but as far as we know it is being used by the accounts department bureaucracy.

The new computer was assigned to the Instant Response Center [KAD] and will serve the security and alarm systems of Athenian store owners. Police officers will supply its "memory" with such information and other data so that it will be able to give answers on general security matters and particularly on matters concerning break ins and criminals.

The American-made computer has been purchased for 20 million drachmas by the Ministry of Commerce following bids on an international basis. It was imported by a Greek company with exclusive rights which will also sell and install the so-called district machines known as "terminals" for 35,000 drachmas each. These terminals will be installed in stores whose owners wish them to be directly connected to KAD. The company agreed to increase the price of the terminal by only 5 percent because of the...price index!

According to police authorities the Ministry of Commerce took into consideration the price and conditions affecting the sale and installation of the terminals before proceeding with the purchase of the new computer. It is our hope that these conditions will be observed until all Athens stores are supplied with terminals.

The computer will start operating in less than a month. During the first phase of operation it will be able to serve 2,000 alarm systems--2,000 stores, banks, and so forth, in other words. This number can be increased by installing a microscopic mechanism in the computer.

The electronic computer gives complete coverage to the whole alarm system. Within 1 minute it monitors all 2,000 terminals and gives information on anything that may happen. It can automatically give information on any damage and even detect the event--if it is, that is, a break in, a fire, inundation, or any accidental incident.

The computer carries out an "investigation" in each store on a 24-hour basis and continually advises KAD. In addition, it has the technical ability to group 15 telephone lines into one. This is of particular economic importance to the store owners because 15 of them in the same area can cooperate and use a common telephone line. As is known, the cost to a store owner who wants to install an alarm directly connected to KAD is great since the Greek Telecommunications Organization charges by the mile when installing a new line!

Presently, 700 jewelry stores, banks, and [insurance] funds in Athens are connected by separate lines to the old KAD technical system (of instant response alarm). KAD has 700 corresponding "little panels" with a small light and thousands of cables! It is anything but a pleasant sight. As a police officer characteristically said, it reminds one of the Monastiraki [market].

But this picture notwithstanding, the whole system is so antiquated that its errors more than overshadow the service it is supposed to provide. We are told that these errors exceed 60 percent! One wonders: Why have such an alarm system? If out of 100 times the security system of a store functions erroneously 60 percent, then why bother with the trouble and cost of its installation? Each time the tiny light appears on the panel the police must rush to the corresponding store fully aware of the error percentage. The myth about the wolf and the lamb is well known...

We have learned something which anything but strengthens store security: The number of cases in which the alarm system correctly reported a burglary or robbery are extremely few. Among them was the armed robbery at the Vourakis jewelry store on Voukourestiou St. But even then the alarm system was activated after the murder of owner Vourakis and the disappearance of the three mafiosi...

Now, with the acquisition of the new computer this anachronism will be eliminated. One TV screen--and only one--will be installed at KAD. All that happens in a store when its alarm goes on will be projected on the screen including the exact time (within a second) the event takes place while a recorder will register all relevant data. This way even the policemen will be monitored...

A small terminal will be installed in the participating store and will monitor its entire area. Up until now the alarm system in most stores covered only the entrance or the store window or both but not the ceiling or side walls thus making it easy for the criminals to operate. The owners of stores which will be connected to KAD for the first time will pay for the terminal (35,000 drachmas) plus the cost of connection. Those already connected to KAD will pay only for the terminal.

Those, however, who do not wish to use the new computer can still have KAD service on the old alarm system at the risk of facing the...mythical wolf. Thus, a picture of an auction market in the Center of Instant Response which is also the center of police action will be preserved.

GOVERNMENT FAVORS DRASTIC WAGE REDUCTIONS

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 17 Oct 80 p 14

[Article by pmr]

[Text] Brussels, 15 Oct--The majority of the Netherlands legislature favors a reduction of real wages in the next year by 2 to 4 percent. During the traditional fall debate about the government policy both members of parliament and the cabinet expressed the conviction that only a strict moderation of wages would allow for a revival of the economy and the preservation of jobs. The enthusiasm of the legislators for savings even exceeded the concept of the government, which had recommended a voluntary wage ceiling of 2 percent in its 1981 budget. Both parliament and government favor a central agreement between labor and management over a renewed intervention of the social ministry that had decreed a universal pay raise of 26 guilders a month, beginning 1 July. Labor contracts concluded to date point to a nominal increase of wages by 8 percent during the next year, roughly sufficient to maintain the purchasing power. The "socioeconomic council," an institutionalized negotiating body including the contract partners and the government, is once again going to be the forum where attempts will be made to limit the nominal pay raise to 6 or even 4 percent, with the talks beginning next Tuesday. The first round of talks in the beginning of October foundered on the rigid fronts of the unions and management.

Differences of Opinion Over Distributing the Cost

Within parliament and the cabinet there are differences of opinion regarding the distribution of the loss of purchasing power among the various levels of income. The Christian-Liberal van Agt cabinet wants to reduce the income of the minimum wage receivers by up to 1.5 percent, and that of higher income earners by up to 3.5 percent. The socialist opposition, on the other hand, does not want to touch the purchasing power of the poorest segments of the population at all, and would rather reduce the top salaries by up to 5 percent. The Christian Democratic governing party has taken its position between the two views, while the Liberals would rather see no income leveling at all. The Christian Democrats would like to implement the wage moderation by foregoing the usual semiannual inflation compensation in 1981, replacing it partially by a tax reduction that would cost the finance ministry 2-3 billion guilders. The necessary funds are to be obtained by raising the value added tax on so-called luxury goods up to 28 percent, and by

accepting an increase in the budget deficit of 1 billion guilders. The wish of the smaller liberal coalition partner to make considerable cuts in the budget and in the social insurance programs did not meet with the approval of the majority of parliament. The liberals' plan included the proposal to pay sick leave only from the second day. The proposals of the government to reduce teachers' pay by a total of 265 million guilders, and to raise the moderated value-added tax from 4 to 4.5 percent were also rejected.

Unions Oppose Reduction of Automatic Salary Adjustment

Up to now the unions have decidedly rejected any reduction of the adjustment of pay to the course of inflation. To date any suspension of consideration of energy price rises in the inflationary spiral was also considered to be taboo. Recently, however, the leader of the largest union, Wim Kok, has indicated a certain willingness to negotiate. He considers it possibly acceptable to consider the deterioration of the terms of trade in salary adjustment. However, since a marked increase in the export price for Dutch natural gas will occur next year, a salary moderation is not to be expected at least in the near future; on the contrary, there might even be an additional raise.

9240

CSO: 3103

SECOND CHAMBER DEBATES SOLUTIONS TO ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD In Dutch 11 Oct 80 p 3

[Article by Marc Chavannes: "Van Agt's Birth as a Revival Economist"]

[Text] The Hague, 11 Oct--Dear Second Chamber, just play in your playground, but do not come out of the high electrified fence consisting of the budget deficit, the balance of payments, the oil company profits and sundry other sacred cattle. The only thing you are really allowed to play with is the public purse. That is how communist Martin Bakker described what the cabinet would like to see take place this week in the Second Chamber, bitterly, with a grain of truth and, as usual, too simply.

It was called the General Political and Financial Observations, for the most part it dealt with our "income level," but if anything was made clear once again, it was that Dutch politics is one continuous cabinet formation.

It is a gordian knot of men and plans. Why did the CDS/PvdA/D'66 [Christian Democratic Appeal/Labor Party/Democrats of 1966] cabinet formation of 1977 go astray? Premier Van Agt, in a fireside chat from the Catshuis [ministerial palace] for AVRO [General Broadcasting Association] television yesterday evening: "Because of the troubles and the harassment."

And why did it work out with Wiesel in just 1 week? "The VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] proved to be a reasonable negotiator, without pranks and tricks. You knew where you stood."

However, no matter how quickly you may form a cabinet, reality does catch up with you. The premier had to admit that in the Chamber this week. Specification '81 was supposed to reduce unemployment to within acceptable limits. The opposite occurred. "But Den Uyl, as a reproach to our inconceivable tepidity, let us just have a look at what developed in unemployment while the government was in your capable hands."

The gentlemen were particularly sharp with one another time and again, in all of which the statesman-in-office, following the proven recipe, pointed out the playground fence to his rival: do not get mad if the other does well, make a gesture from time to time as though you are really scarcely listening, then attack again with an almost economical argument and where possible remind the statesman-out-of-office of material difficulties from his own years in office.

It must be said that Den Uyl had drawn conclusions from earlier trials of strength and had obviously given instructions to remember that there will be elections in 6 months. His financial spokesman, Kombrink, jumped around the interruption microphones like a fighting cat on velvet feet and his battering ram on the housing front, former secretary of state Van Dam, operated this time with the disinterested acuity of a student debater.

There Must Be Moderation

What is it supposed to have been about all these days, you ask yourself in the meantime. Looking through the glasses of the minister president, the case on the docket for some months is "There Must Be Moderation." The colorful array of choices on the market of political problems has never entranced him, but during his term as prime minister, Van Agt has surprised friend and foe alike by being able to penetrate problems he himself recognizes as acute with technical and political precision. For example, when he once knew that the gray area in Europe was and why NATO wants to deploy intermediate range missiles, he was unstoppable.

Not only did he put Minister Van Der Klaauw in his vest pocket, but in no uncertain way he left his not remiss colleague from defense, Scholten, dazed in his wake in his equally bizarre and effective solo against the "pranks and tricks" of his own CDA delegation.

Now it is more than clear that it is hard economic policy to which Van Agt has (finally) devoted himself. He no longer talks of it as though it were a debate among a few grasping atheists. Perhaps he still feels that way, but he no longer lets it show.

It is naturally a good time for a politician like Van Agt to join in the economists' debate. There are good tie-ins now for someone who has been fired up about the paternal state's too pronounced give-away urge. In a time of economic recession, the lover of an ethical revival sees his chance to make a plea against jealousy, against "the nibbling for which we really ought to be a little ashamed."

He makes a call on our readiness to sacrifice and patience in order to solve together "a fantastic problem of enormous extent" (unemployment). And he strikes his mark: there are numbers of highly educated economists on his side.

The old means of modesty fits in very well with the new thriftiness: "The cabinet has tried to do what is necessary under the most difficult of circumstances, with little flag-waving and with little outcry, but with determination, and certainly at the least with a maximum sense of responsibility."

The early 1970's are back, when Drees Jr. [Van Agt] was already predicting that public financing of everything and then some would not go on. The profit principle, now recognized at least by the CDA and the VVD and perhaps also by the D'66 as a means of keeping things going, is back.

And back on the platform, too, were former minister and KVP delegation chairman Schmelzer and the other D'70 [Democratic Socialists of 1970] member from the Biesheuvel cabinet: former minister De Brauw who had the temerity to ask 1,000 guilders of students for 1 year's study at a university.

It could be determined without any malicious pleasure this week that the recession is most difficult for the left. Where D'66 (without any following in the labor movement) could be very flexible and pragmatic in the current economic circumstances, the Labor Party had to weigh solutions against one another of which they would not have had to dream a few years ago.

Now the PvdA is even going along with cutbacks in social security up to 230 million guilders, a painful choice for those who had defended that security most strongly.

Enticing Rituals

But the PvdA was not the only one that had to retreat. The CDA delegation, too, for which Den Uyl had carefully performed enticing rituals, proved to have joined the march downwards. The buying power of the lowest paid really ought to remain the same, but cannot be guaranteed. After giving the VVD a few raps in the first session, CDA delegation chairman Lubbers made it quite plain in the second round that his party sees that Dutch industry is now poised on the edge of the abyss.

The part of the satisfied host on his own grounds was played by the VVD delegation, who were slipped a few unexpected treats Thursday evening by Finance Minister Van Der Stee. Financial spokesman Joekes was so pleased that he declined to make further statements. The result could only be spoiled by the further analysis of the most desirable promises.

In part because of a "biological relapse of a purely conjectural nature" (intestinal difficulties) which caused Premier Van Agt to spend Wednesday in the Holy Land Foundation rather than in the Second Chamber, the debate wound up as inconclusive. The remainder will follow Tuesday. Before it comes to that, the cabinet has much to discuss and to take into consideration: internally something resembling a position will have to be determined. In order to do that, not only millions but also noses will have to be counted, not only in the Chamber but also behind the government table.

Belated Recognition

There was in fact a former minister present at the Binnenhof, even though he was not visible: resigned Finance Minister Andriessen, who has been given belated recognition by the cabinet and the CDA. Andriessen's constant opponent will sit down behind his house organ and try his hand this weekend at the first notes of a wage regulation.

Perhaps we will find out next week how that sounds to his ears.

6940

CSO: 3105

DUTCH AID CONTRIBUTES TO STABLE 'NEW ORDER' IN SURINAME

Emergency Program Started

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 4 Oct 80 p 1

[Article by Frans van Klaveren]

[Text] After 5 days of deliberations the Committee Development Cooperation Netherlands-Suriname (Cons) approved in principle 96 percent of all projects submitted by Suriname.

This means that President and Prime Minister Chin A Sen can begin to execute his urgency program. In person he will inform the media on Tuesday exactly which projects are involved. The total sum of development funds involved amounts to 500 million guilders.

After the completion of the successful discussions the chairman of the Dutch Cons delegation, Prof Dr F. van Dam, said: "We have learned from the past" when projects were inadequately executed.

Remarkable is the streamlining applied to guarantee fast execution of Chin A Sen's emergency program. To speed things up the Cons has set up a body called the Committee Urgency Program (Cup) which can give final approval to projects already approved in principle.

The Netherlands will also contribute 1 million Suriname guilders to a "monitoring center" which will be part of the Plan Bureau. Suriname also gave 1 million Surinamese guilders. This center is supposed to eliminate difficult situations in the execution of the projects.

It reports on a weekly basis to the president and prime minister on progress in the execution of the projects. The center will be in constant contact with the civil servants responsible for the execution of the urgency projects.

The amount of 500 million guilders needed to finance the urgency program was brought together through reallocation of already promised but not yet paid out amounts and by changes in the allocation of funds agreed upon in December of last year by Minister De Koning and the Surinamese minister Cambridge.

Dutch Support Emergency Program

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 4 Oct 80 p 13

[Article by Frans van Klaveren]

[Text] The Netherlands has laid a solid foundation for the "new order of things" in Suriname by making 500 million guilders available for Suriname's government leader Chin A Sen's urgency program. After 5 days of deliberations between the Surinamese and the Dutch delegations of Cons (Committee Development Cooperation Netherlands-Suriname) it was announced in Paramaribo that more than 96 percent of the projects submitted by Suriname had been approved in principle.

This important solution for Suriname does not come as a surprise. After the partial failure of Dutch Minister of Development and Cooperation De Koning's visit to Suriname 2 months ago, one of the causes of a chilling effect on the relationship between the two countries, it was clear that no stone would be left unturned to prevent a further worsening of relations. Since Minister De Koning already promised full cooperation with Chin A Sen's urgency program--only the Surinamese demand that the promised funds be protected against inflation ruined the situation--it was important that projects acceptable to both countries be listed on the Cons-agenda. To prevent disagreeable surprises the Dutch Cons chairman, Prof Dr F. van Dam, traveled a month ago to Paramaribo for preliminary discussions. The result, according to the declaration of both Cons delegations, was that the discussions took place in "a cordial, businesslike, and cooperative atmosphere." Or, as expressed after one of the meetings was finished, by adviser Hans van Mierlo: "Conflicts remained in harmony."

Suriname submitted a list of 57 projects in total, one more was added later. Of these 58 projects, 55 were approved in principle, of which 25 definitely; this amounts to 167 million Surinamese guilders.

Before the start of the Cons discussions President and Prime Minister Chin A Sen pointed out the importance of the beginning at last of the actual development of Suriname.

"The Netherlands is to Suriname what Russia is to Cuba and the American lobby to Israel." According to him the 15th Cons meeting should be the end of the past, when the poor did not benefit at all from the spending of development funds.

The combativeness of Chin A Sen's government declaration is also noticeable in the way new agreements were made within the framework of the Cons discussions. "With a view to the character of this urgency program" the approval of projects can be accelerated in the meantime.

To this end the Committee Urgency Program (Cup) was established; Cons is represented in it by the secretaries of both sections assisted by experts. Projects which could not be definitely approved at the Cons meeting will be referred to the Cup and can be approved by this body. If the Cup cannot reach a decision the problems will be resubmitted to the Cons.

If needed, an interim approval procedure to be decided by both chairmen can be used.

The Cup also holds a decisive voice in the choice of advising bureaus, which are needed to work out the details and prepare specifications of urgency projects and their budgets if the funds are coming from the Dutch development aid.

Watchdog

To report delays in the execution of projects and facilitate their elimination the Surinamese government--"to the great satisfaction" of the Cons committee--has instituted an "urgency program monitoring center" within the framework of the Plan Bureau. This center of seven experts acts as watchdog. Every week the team will have to report to the Prime Minister on progress in the execution of the urgency projects, present solutions to troublesome points, and suggest possibilities to increase efficiency.

If money is needed to eliminate problems the monitoring center has monitoring funds at its disposal, specially created for this purpose. Suriname and The Netherlands each contribute 1 million Surinamese guilders, which gives the fund a starting capital of 2 million guilders.

The 15th Cons meeting had to solve the problem of finding 500 million guilders for the urgency program. It was achieved through wheeling and dealing, or, in Cons terminology, "reallocation of already allocated sums of money." In the end the parity fund was charged with a reserve fund established in the past to a total of 115 million guilders.

Reproaches

Surinamese reproaches about delays in transferring funds from The Netherlands will be something of the past.

As regards money transfers it was agreed in principle that requests will be submitted quarterly, but the possibility of interim requests is not excluded. The question now is which of the projects were approved in principle or definitely by the 15th Cons meeting, and which of the listed projects will be announced by President and Prime Minister Chin A Sen in person. Political observers in Paramaribo consider this a sign that Chin A Sen is happy about the result of the discussions, which will ultimately be the basis of his urgency program.

The next--16th--Cons meeting will be chaired by Prof Van Dam on 22 November; again in Paramaribo, because according to the agreement all Cons meetings will from now on be held in the Surinamese capital.

10319
CSO: 3105

NORDLI DEFENDS CABINET CHANGES, DISCUSSES ELECTIONS

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 6 Oct 80 pp 13014

[Interview with Premier Odvar Nordli by Terje Pedersen and Gunnar A. Johansen: "No Need for a Vote of Confidence"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Is it true that you have thought about quitting as head of the government?

[Answer] What is true is that if the party organs had not raised the government question I would have taken the initiative at the end of this year to discuss this question. This is a matter I think the party and the trade union movement should have the opportunity to discuss from time to time. However, such discussions should not be made public. I do not mean that I alone should decide the question of my being a candidate for the premiership. It should not be seen as a personal tragedy that a position is discussed. Our political opponents are constantly raising the question of a candidate for premier. This creates a situation in which thousands of party members become confused. This is why I thought it would be natural to raise the question at the end of the year, before the annual meetings of the county locals.

[Question] Do you regard it as a declaration of confidence that the party and the LO [National Federation of Trade Unions] have asked you to take on the task of being a candidate for premier at the coming election? And if so, did you need such a declaration of confidence?

[Answer] No declaration of confidence was necessary. That is what I feel. But I respect the party leadership for wanting a clarification. Our political opponents have constantly called for a clarification of the premier question. When the clarification comes, then they say that it is quite unusual.

[Question] At the 1975 congress the party appointed a candidate for the position of premier while at the same time electing a party chairman. Is it natural for the question of a premier to become a subject of debate at the congress next spring?

[Answer] I have never thought it natural for the Labor Party congress to appoint a candidate for the post of premier. If the congress does so, and a completely new situation subsequently arises, the party is locked in. The congress is and will remain the party's highest organ, while the question of a candidate for premier must be left to the party organs which formulate policies between congresses.

[Question] The bourgeois newspapers have not exactly been full of praise after the latest changes in the cabinet. Terms such as "political pensioners" have been used about the new ministers. Does the Labor Party have trouble renewing itself?

[Answer] It is ridiculous that 50 year-olds have become pensioners. It is a meaningless assertion. We have politicians in this country who are much older and nevertheless some of the most vital. The government in office needs no rejuvenation.

[Question] Do you feel that in appointing the new cabinet members you picked the best in the labor movement?

[Answer] I have a safe feeling that now as at other times we got the best obtainable. I do not believe in the existence of "the best." At the moment one starts with the idea that one must have the absolute best in the sense of supermen, one would find it difficult to form a government. The new ministers have broad experience in various political fields. Time and again they have shown themselves to be skillful politicians. When in this situation they have said Yes to entering the government they deserve recognition in a high degree. The most important thing to me is not that the ministers receive a lot of flowers when they come into the government, but what is said when they leave.

[Question] What importance do you think the latest changes in the cabinet will have for the Labor Party's election campaign?

[Answer] I don't think they will be important. Other things will be important. The election campaign is primarily a test of political strength, not a model show of individuals. The policies we hammer out will be decisive. I do not mean that personalities are of no significance.

[Question] You have said that if it had been up to you you would not have made the changes at this time. How do you assess the drawbacks of such frequent changes in the government as we have seen?

[Answer] I believe we have entered a period when frequent changes in the cabinet will become more and more common, with no dramatics behind them.

[Question] Do you have any assurance that this government will remain in office up until the election?

[Answer] That is the assumption, but one can never be sure.

[Question] Is it more difficult now than it once was to get people to take on a minister's job?

[Answer] I have nothing on which to base such a judgment. It is an exhausting task, both physically and psychically, not least because of the media-oriented society we live in. I fear that in the future we may have robots without feelings as politicians, affected by nothing. I do not believe they would be useful in a democracy.

[Question] In the latest opinion poll by the Marketing and Media Institute the Labor Party shows a loss of 2.3 percent. Do you believe this connected with the discussion on stockpiling?

[Answer] I do not deny that that may be the reason, but whether it is the whole explanation I do not know. If doubt arises about so essential questions as security policy, I am afraid that the Labor Party may encounter political difficulties.

CABINET SHUFFLE HAS LITTLE POLITICAL IMPLICATION

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 6 Oct 80 p 4

[Editorial: "The Government and the Election"]

[Text] Less than a year remains before the next Storting election. Naturally enough, almost everything that happens in the political arena will at this time be measured against the effect of the election outcome.

This applies as well to the assessment of the latest cabinet changes. AFTENPOSTEN sees the changes as a weakening of the government and interprets what has happened as a sign of "a party in great internal stress." Against this background we understand very well that the Conservatives' main organ receives what has happened as "the government party's gift to the opposition before the 1981 Storting election."

However, we seldom feel as reassured as when AFTENPOSTEN anticipates nonsocialist election victories. Here as well it applies that most often pride goes before a fall.

As far back as we remember it has been asserted that governments undergoing changes are weakened when prominent ministers enter other occupations. And this conclusion is correct, of course--at least for a time. In any case, it is unreasonable to carry such conclusions too far before those who take over have had a chance to prove their worth. Besides, the government does not necessarily "collapse" merely because three ministers resign for heavily weighing and fully understandable personal reasons. The vacuum they left has been filled by highly qualified new cabinet members and the Nordli government still stands out as a strong government. Nor do the personnel changes mean a change in the policies to be carried out. And another thing: personalities are important symbols in politics, but the program and the policies, as they are formulated in party concert, are more important.

After the shuffle in the Nordli Government that has now taken place, the Labor Party steps forward with the government personnel that will meet the voters next fall. This applies to the government chief, Odvar Nordli, as well. In connection with the cabinet changes a declaration has been issued, removing all doubt in this area. With Odvar Nordli's strong position in the labor movement and among Labor Party voters, we do not regard such a declaration as particularly necessary "for internal use." On the other hand, it is useful for stopping speculations outside the labor movement itself. Recently there have been many examples of such

speculation in the bourgeois press. And that part of the press which will become less and less friendly toward the Labor Party as the election approaches can now safely put such speculation aside. The Labor Party has presented its government as an alternative to the voters. When can the nonsocialist parties be expected to do the same? Concurrently with the latest changes in the government, DAGBLADET presented a Gallup poll, showing a setback of 2.3 percent for the Labor Party in September. Usually there is no reason to assign too much importance to monthly shifts in such polls. However, when the swing is as great as in this case there is reason to ask what happened. There can be little doubt that the debate on advance stockpiling has had an unfavorable effect for the Labor Party. The matter is in itself no great question of defense and security policy. However, the debate in the Labor Party--and the interpretation of the debate--has created uncertainty among the voters. It is now of decisive importance to the Labor Party to have this matter decided, bringing an end to the debate. Quite other matters must be brought into the foreground for the purpose of gaining increased support for the party.

Perhaps most important of all now is concentration upon the final work upon the program in the party and the trade union movement. Here is where the matters are to be hammered out which a unified labor movement is to use in the election campaign to assure that the Labor Party continues to be the governing party. The starting point is not a poor one. The Labor Party has won elections with poorer Gallup results than those we see now. The election is neither lost nor won. The Labor Party does not gain victory gratis. The need is now that all party supporters put their backs into it. Then the goal can be gained. The alternative is a bourgeois government. Then we shall really see what a "weakened government" means.

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GROUP IN FOREIGN MINISTRY SHARES EVENSEN'S VIEWS ON USSR

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 Oct 80 p 2

[Article by Nils Morten Udgaard: "Norway, Evensen and the Barents Sea"]

[Text] Our new, week-old "Evensen Case" has stirred up a lot of dust concerning conditions in the Labor Party, the political loyalty obligations of persons in high office, nuclear weapons, nuclear-free zones, stockpiling and negotiations in the North between Norway and the Soviet Union. But when the dust settles the latter matter will appear ever more clearly as the most important: How do Ambassador Jens Evensen's opinions and his position vis-a-vis the Russians as the Norwegian leader of the negotiations affect the expectations created and the policy formulated in the Kremlin? Here we have some experiences of the 1970s to draw on, for Evensen's viewpoints are neither new nor unknown to the foreign leaderships in Oslo and Moscow. Nor is he alone about such thoughts in the Norwegian foreign ministry, where there is a small group of "Evensen men" in important positions.

The importance of drawing the border line on the continental shelf in the north must not be underestimated. When the border line in the ocean is drawn toward the North Pole we shall have a common border with Soviet Union longer than our border with any other country and longer than the entire Soviet border with Eastern Europe. Purely geometrically, the Soviet Union will take over the position as our most important neighboring state. When Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund now--after his 8 October address--declares "I am no authoritarian type who believes problems can be solved by insistence upon some disciplinary regulation or other," we must interpret him to the effect that Evensen is to continue as leader of these border negotiations in the north.

As it came out during the address, what characterizes Evensen's attitude is that he equates the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and that he directs his criticism of nuclear rearmament at the Americans. For example, he mentions the planned American missile, the MX, which can accommodate 10 warheads, without mentioning the Russians's most powerful missile, the SS 18, with its 10 warheads, that has already been in place for several years. "Strategically, the modern use of the ocean brought the two superpowers closer to each other, so that in reality Norway is squeezed between the two power blocks," he says. Evensen also criticizes the NATO decision on new nuclear weaponry that Norway joined in taking last year, and presents a number of misgivings concerning the planned stockpiling. He also places great stress upon formalization of the existing nuclear-free zone

that is to cover Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland, although this is a proposal the government has rejected because it would make this country a football in international politics: Moscow would be in guaranteeing definitions that would limit Norway's freedom of action, while the Russians themselves have no limitations placed upon them. What Evensen presents is not new, but old, chewed-over ideas of 20 years ago concerning nuclear weaponry and nuclear-free zones, and his proposal for making all of Central Europe into a nuclear-free zone lies decidedly beyond the range of the serious political debate on balance and relaxation of tension in our continent. His overall idea is that Norway is to keep out of things to the extent possible, make its own arrangements, also to the extent possible, and depend upon contacts and relaxation of tensions, not as a part of, but as replacement for a balance of military power. The belief that the Soviet Union is moving slowly toward becoming the power of the future in Europe also belongs in the picture.

There is nothing new in Evensen's way of thinking, which we find generations back, both within and outside of the Labor Party. But it is something new that Norway since 1974 has found itself in a negotiation position of the classical kind with the Soviet Union--and is still in it. In these negotiations Evensen has always played a central role, from October 1973 to January 1979 as law-of-the-sea minister and later as special ambassador. This despite the fact that it soon became clear that Evensen represented a philosophy different from official Norwegian thinking, and that the differences have increased with time.

The first hint came in an article in ARBEIDERBLADET of 7 March 1975, followed by an address in the Oslo Workers' Society on 16 April, less than 6 months after the first formal round of negotiations between Norway and the Soviet Union concerning the Barents Sea. His differences [with the government view] became even plainer when in November, 1976, he published a book on "Norway's Law-of-the-Sea and Resources Policies," containing contributions by several of his closest fellow workers among holders of high office and politicians. The Russians have seen these differences, of course. As a result they have--and as negotiation counterparts they are fully justified in so doing--attempted to exploit the differences on the Norwegian side: The negotiations with the foreign ministry were sidetracked, and constantly more important parts of the negotiations were dumped into Evensen's lap.

Kjell Eliassen, then chief of the justice section of the foreign ministry, led the negotiations on the dividing line in November, 1974. November and December, 1975, July and December, 1976, with the Russian Boris Podserob--former ambassador to Ankara and Vienna--as his counterpart. In October, 1976, Evensen completed negotiations in Moscow on an extensive fisheries agreement with the Soviet Union, and at the same time it also became known that he also had meetings with people of the Soviet foreign affairs ministry to discuss a "preliminary" dividing line between the fisheries zones--a line which in effect could also establish the continental shelf line. Three days after this became known in Norway, the government organ IZVESTIYA came out with a very unusual attack upon Evensen because of statements he had made concerning Svalbard. Twice he was mentioned by name, and the round of negotiations he led in December of the same year was the most fruitless of all. In effect, these negotiations were now put on ice.

In 1977 it was Evensen who negotiated in Moscow on an arrangement for the area where the fisheries zones meet. And he met with real top diplomats: Oleg Khlestov, member of the "collegium" that leads the Soviet foreign ministry, chief of the justice section, and from time to time the Soviet leader during the important MBFR [expansion unknown] discussions in Vienna. He took part in the discussions which in June, 1977, led to the controversial "grey zone agreement," but his name was not published. He was mentioned merely as a "high-ranking" official. Outwardly, Fisheries Minister Aleksandr Ishkov stood out. During the same fall, Evensen met Khlestov secretly in London, where they agreed on the "supplementary declaration" that was to make the grey zone agreement acceptable through mutual promises concerning speedy negotiations on a final border line in the Barents Sea.

Nothing happened in 1978, however; a year passed with several Norwegian-Soviet incidents. At the turn of the year, Evensen resigned as minister, and in March, 1979, Ambassador Heige Videnes, head of the foreign ministry's North group, went to Moscow to sound out the problems in the north. On 22 February 1980, immediately following Afghanistan, there then came a surprising Soviet invitation to new negotiations. In the meantime, Vindenæs had taken over the position as the oil counselor, and the negotiation task in Moscow fell to Evensen. This fifth round took place in April, but was as barren of results as the former rounds, despite a pause of 3 1/2 years.

Actually, the Soviet Union has not entered into real negotiations with the Norwegian foreign ministry thus far concerning the border line in the Barents Sea. Instead it has constantly attempted to influence the political framework around the negotiations on the Norwegian side--by interfering in the selection of Norwegian negotiators, by seeking expanded contacts with the Labor Party's party organs, by military pressure in the form of missile exercises in the contested area, and by means of severe attacks interspersed by conciliatory gestures, such as the invitations to a new round of negotiations and a visit to Moscow by Frydenlund. What the Russians are not doing is to negotiate seriously and in a businesslike way with the Norwegian government on a border in the north. Nor will they ever do so, as long as we on the Norwegian side give them reason to believe that results will be better from their point of view if they take advantage of disagreements we ourselves have built into our negotiation methods.

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VIRTUALLY ALL COUNTY LABOR PARTY UNITS APPROVE STOCKPILING

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Oct 80 p 3

[Article: "All Labor Party County Units Positive to Stockpiling"]

[Text] The government's plan for stockpiling of allied equipment has been approved by virtually all county units that have thus far expressed opinions. This applies to the locals in Hedmark, More, Trondelag and two of the three northern counties. The board of Oslo Labor Party is the exception. As is known, the plan calls for stockpiling for Allied forces in Trondelag and for Norwegian forces in Northern Norway. After Foreign Affairs Minister Knut Frydenlund had presented this to the National Board of the Labor Party early in September, a statement was adopted, after hard debate, in which the National Board expresses approval of the government's plan and work with stockpiling. At the same time, the statement called for new discussion of the matter when "all important sides of the matter are clarified." Premier Odvar Nordli pointed out that the purport of the statement is that the government will negotiate with the United States about stockpiling (in Trondelag).

According to what AFTENPOSTEN has learned, stockpiling has thus far been discussed by various Labor Party gatherings in seven counties, including Oslo Labor Party, in which the board has expressed scepticism concerning the plan, and where the board of representatives will finalize discussion of the matter in November.

On the other hand, the premier's county party in Hedmark has voted 68 to 14 in favor of the government's line. In More and Romsdal Labor Party the matter has been discussed in a trade union/political conference, which unanimously approved of the national board's statement. The government's plan has received approval of the board of South Trondelag Labor Party. In North Trondelag county party circles declare themselves in favor of the government and the Storting establishing defense and security policies. There it is assumed that a special conference on stockpiling will be held later.

The matter has also been dealt with at election leader conferences in both Nordland and Finnmark, in both places with a solid majority for the line of the government and the national board.

The national board of the Labor Party will meet again 1-2 December. According to what AFTENPOSTEN has learned, it is the intention at that time to discuss stockpiling for the second time.

Some local units have also expressed opinions, with reactions divided rather evenly between for and against, it is said.

'INFORMATION COMMITTEE' ORGANIZES TO STOP STOCKPILING

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Oct 80 p 3

[Article by Erling Koldaas: "Improper Action Against Defense"]

[Text] No dangerous threat to our present security and defense policies. This view characterizes political comments made on the formation of a new "information committee," the goal of which is to work for disarmament and against essential features of Norwegian defense policy. "It is a matter of old arguments in new editions," asserts Kare Willoch, Conservative parliamentary leader. In the opinion of Reiulf Steen, Labor Party chairman, such a campaign is inappropriate.

Led by District Judge Arne Haugestad, leader of the Popular Movement against the EC, a group of persons yesterday announced that they had prepared the ground for a countrywide "Information Committee" against [sic] disarmament. In addition to Haugestad, among the members of the group are Professor Johan Galtung, Docent Eva Nordland and Professor Torstein Echkhoff. Arthur Svensson, chairman of the Norwegian Federation of Chemical Workers, says to NTB [Norwegian Telegram Bureau] that he would have to see the appeal before he decides whether or not to support the initiative. Many things also indicate that such prominent persons in the Labor Party as Ambassador Jens Evensen and Storting member Ingrid Eide have participated in the preparations.

The main goal is that of working for disarmament, but with Arne Haugestad as one of the main sponsors, many see a new popular movement with wider goals than this alone.

"Not at all," says Haugestad, who states that the fight against stockpiling and emplacement of nuclear weapons is far more central to the purpose than, for example, the question of Norwegian NATO membership."

"All those thus far mentioned as supporters of the "Information Committee" are known for their left-wing socialist viewpoints on these questions, and I will in no way overestimate their ability to affect public opinion," says Conservative parliamentary Kare Willoch, who considers it reassuring that the action in this way reveals that in reality the traditional NATO opponents are behind it. "In reality it is a matter of old arguments in a new edition," says Willoch. "And this happens after these arguments have demonstrated errorneousness in the course of 30 years. Pertinent debate is always welcome, and I hope we shall avoid the appeals to thought-paralyzing fear we know from earlier debates."

Premier Odvar Nordli does not wish to comment on the formation of the "Information Committee," but Rolf Steen, Labor Party chairman, does not see Arne Haugestad and his cohorts in a favorable light.

"I am unable to see what they really hope to gain," says Steen, "and it seems that such a campaign is somehow inappropriate." Steen hinted that the initiators of the Information Committee have other, more far-ranging goals than merely an action to work for disarmament.

Storting representative Gro Harlem Brundtland, Labor Party vice-chairman, asserts that as far as the Labor Party is concerned it is best served by carrying on its debate on security and defense policies internally in the party. "It is uncertain what such an action can lead to," she says, "but it is clear that it can worsen the disunity that has existed in the Labor Party."

Johan J. Jakobsen, Center Party chairman and parliamentary leader, is convinced that our present policy is solidly anchored both politically and in the Norwegian people. "We have not had any negative reactions to the decision of our national board in support of the plans for stockpiling," says Jakobsen, "and this indicates that the Committee action will gain very little support in our ranks."

"In any case, it must awaken those who see a credible defense as part of our democracy," says Lars Korvald, parliamentary leader of the Christian People's Party. "I do not believe anybody in our party will support such an action, but, of course, it could contribute to stimulating the Left in Norwegian politics."

"It will be very unfortunate if the new action becomes identified with or seen as a continuation of the Popular Movement against the EC," says Hans Borgen, former chairman of the Popular Movement, who stresses that no such connection exists. Nor does he wish to support Arne Haugestad's new movement.

Borgen does not believe that former members of the Popular Movement against the EC will constitute any large part of the membership of the action, but stresses that Haugestad must, of course, be free to engage himself in whatever he wishes.

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